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Notions of Reproductive Harm
in Canadian Law: Addressing
Exposures to Household Chemicals
as Reproductive Torts
Alana Cattapan*, Roxanne Mykitiuk** &
Mark Pioro***
Mounting scientific evidence is suggesting that various synthetic chemicals are ubiquitous
in the household and natural environment, and are affecting reproductive health in
humans. Yet litigation in response to exposure to harmful chemicals has had limited
success. This is in large part because causation is often difficult to prove, as exposure
often occurs over long periods of time, and the sources of suspected chemical agents are
ubiquitous and/or diffuse. In light of these challenges, there is a need to consider new
legal strategies to confront these harms.
This article examines the potential for prenatal exposure to harmful chemicals to
be approached as reproductive torts as opposed to toxic torts. Focusing on two groups
of household chemicals – brominated flame retardants and phthalates – this article
identifies the ways in which prenatal injury claims and birth torts (i.e. wrongful
pregnancy, wrongful birth, and wrongful life cases) can inform future litigation
regarding prenatal exposures to risky household chemicals. In particular, reproductive
tort jurisprudence offers a variety of ways of conceptualizing causation, injury and fault
in cases where individuals are exposed to synthetic household chemicals before birth.
*



BSocSc, MA, PhD candidate at York University.
BA, LLB, LLM, JSD, Associate Professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law
School.
BA, MA, JD (of the Ontario Bar), was a Research Associate at Osgoode
Hall Law School while employed on this project. The authors made equal
contributions to this article and appear in alphabetical order.
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I.

Introduction1

T

he human health effects of exposure to synthetic chemicals,
ubiquitous in present-day society, call attention to the vulnerability
of reproductive and developmental processes that may be influenced by
these substances. Biological systems developing in utero and throughout
childhood are particularly susceptible to environmental influences,2
and exposures may result in negative health effects, including harms to
the reproductive system.3 Cases of exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES)
offer a historically significant example in which exposure to synthetic
1.

2.

3.

Supported by grant RHF100625 and grant RHF-100626 from the
Institute for Human Development, Child and Youth Health (IHDCYH),
Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR).
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee
on Health Care for Underserved Women & American Society for
Reproductive Medicine Practice Committee, “Committee Opinion
No 575: Exposure to Toxic Environmental Agents” (2013) 122:4
Obstetrics & Gynecology 931 at 931; Philippe Grandjean et al, “The
Faroes Statement: Human Health Effects of Developmental Exposure
to Chemicals in Our Environment” (2008) 102:2 Basic & Clinical
Pharmacology & Toxicology 73.
For example, a number of human studies have shown that exposures to
common household plasticizers (phthatlates) “are associated with a direct
adverse effect on androgen function in men,” and linked to shortened
anogenital distance. See Richard Grady & Sheela Sathyanarayana,
“An Update on Phthalates and Male Reproductive Development and
Function” (2012) 13:4 Current Urology Reports 307 at 309.
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chemicals had substantive effects for those exposed in utero and for the
children of those exposed in utero.4 In addition, fetuses and children
face higher exposure rates to chemicals due to their smaller size, and, for
children, the accumulation of toxic substances in breast milk and their
close physical contact with household objects.5
Currently, a number of household chemicals are under scrutiny
due to their ubiquity and the identification of potential harms to the
reproductive health of those exposed in utero, particularly harms to
male reproductive health. For example, brominated flame retardants
(BFRs), found in furniture, carpeting, electronics, children’s pyjamas,
and a number of other consumer products,6 are found in the blood of
most of the general population and have been linked to altered testicular
cells in male rats exposed in utero.7 Epidemiological studies have also
suggested the existence of correlative relationships between exposures
to BFRs and reduced testis size, sperm concentration,8 altered hormone
4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

See Richard Goldberg, “Causation and Drugs: The Legacy of
Diethylstilbestrol” (1996) 25 Anglo-Am L Rev 286; W Lenz, “A Short
History of Thalidomide Embryopathy” (1988) 38:3 Teratology 203.
See for example Joseph L Jacobson, Sandra W Jacobson & Harold EB
Humphrey, “Effects of Exposure to PCBs and Related Compounds
on Growth and Activity in Children” (1990) 12:4 Neurotoxicology
and Teratology 319 at 319 (on the breastmilk point); Theo Colborn,
Frederick S vom Saal & Ana M Soto, “Developmental Effects of
Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals in Wildlife and Humans” (1993)
101:5 Environmental Health Perspectives 378 (on the vulnerability
and permanent nature of exposure during development); Vincent F
Garry, “Pesticides and Children” (2004) 198:2 Toxicology and Applied
Pharmacology 152; Philippe Grandjean et al, “The Faroes Statement:
Human Health Effects of Developmental Exposure to Chemicals in
Our Environment” (2008) 102:2 Basic & Clinical Pharmacology &
Toxicology 73 (on sensitivity of fetal and neonatal development).
Sheila R Ernest et al, “Effects of Chronic Exposure to an Environmentally
Relevant Mixture of Brominated Flame Retardants on the Reproductive
and Thyroid System in Adult Male Rats” (2012) 127:2 Toxicological
Sciences 496.
Yi-Qian Ma, Understanding the Effects of Exposure to an Environmentally
Relevant Mixture of Brominated Flame Retardant Congeners on the Function
and Development of the Male Gonad (M Sc Thesis, McGill University
Faculty of Medicine, 2013) [unpublished] at 61.
K Akutsu et al, “Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers in Human Serum and
Sperm Quality” (2008) 80:4 Bulletin of Environmental Contamination
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levels,9 and birth weight anomalies.10 Phthalates are another class of
household chemicals that are found in cleaning supplies, building
materials, cosmetics, toys, food packaging, medical devices, clothing, and
other plasticized consumer goods.11 Animal studies have demonstrated
negative effects of phthalate exposure in utero, including reduced
testosterone production12 as well as cryptorchidism,13 hypospadias,14
and shortened anogenital distance15 in males.16 Human studies have
also suggested a correlation between in utero exposure to phthalates and
reduced anogenital distance and cryptorchidism.17 Though scientific
9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.
15.

16.

17.

Toxicology 345 at 349.
John D Meeker et al, “Polybrominated Diphenyl Ether (PBDE)
Concentrations in House Dust are Related to Hormone Levels in Men”
(2009) 407:10 Science of the Total Environment 3425 at 3428.
Sanna Lignell et al, “Prenatal Exposure to Polychlorinated Biphenyls
(PCBs) and Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers (PBDEs) May Influence
Birth Weight Among Infants in a Swedish Cohort With Background
Exposure: A Cross-sectional Study” (2013) 12:44 Environmental Health
1.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee
on Health Care for Underserved Women & American Society for
Reproductive Medicine Practice Committee, supra note 2 at 933.
Daniel B Martinez-Arguelles et al, “In Utero Exposure to the
Antiandrogen Di-(2-Ethylhexyl) Phthalate Decreases Adrenal Aldosterone
Production in the Adult Rat” (2011) 85:1 Biology of Reproduction 51 at
60.
Jane S Fisher et al, “Human ‘Testicular Dysgenesis Syndrome’: A Possible
Model Using In-utero Exposure of the Rat to Dibutyl Phthalate” (2003)
18:7 Human Reproduction (Oxford Journals) 1383.
Ibid.
Bethany R Hannas, “Dose-Response Assessment of Fetal Testosterone
Production and Gene Expression Levels in Rat Testes Following In Utero
Exposure to Diethylhexyl Phthalate, Diisobutyl Phthalate, Diisoheptyl
Phthalate, and Diisononyl Phthalate” (2011) 123:1 Toxicological
Sciences 206; M Ema, E Miyawaki & K Kawashima, “Further
Evaluation of Developmental Toxicity of Di-n-butyl Phthalate Following
Administration During Late Pregnancy in Rats” (1998) 98:1-2 Toxicology
Letters 87.
Cryptorchidism occurs when “one or both testicles do not descend into
the scrotum.” Hypospadias is a condition in which the “urethral opening
is displaced toward the scrotum.” See Leonard J Paulozzi, “International
Trends in Rates of Hypospadias and Cryptorchidism” (1999) 107:4
Environmental Health Perspectives 297 at 297.
Shanna H Swan, “Environmental Phthalate Exposure in Relation to
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studies have not conclusively demonstrated links between exposures to
BFRs and phthalates and intergenerational reproductive harm, there is
accumulating evidence about effects of in utero exposure to household
chemicals and the development of the reproductive system.
Over the past several decades, Canada and other countries have
developed legislation and public policy responding to knowledge of
these effects.18 In addition to state-based interventions, consumers

18.

Reproductive Outcomes and Other Health Endpoints in Humans”
(2008) 108:2 Environmental Research 177.
For example, the 1999 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, SC 1999,
c 33 [CEPA] is the primary legislation governing toxic chemicals in
Canada, and following an expansion of the Act’s regulatory scheme in
2008, the “use, [sale], offer for sale or import” of some widely used BFRs
(namely polybrominated diphenyl ethers or PBDEs) was banned. The
2006 expansion of the federal regulation of toxics was encapsulated under
the three-part Chemicals Management Plan [CMP], which aimed to get
“tough on toxics” through 1) issuing a “challenge” to industry to better
self-regulate and provide information to the public about particularly
hazardous chemicals; 2) increased regulation of “food, cosmetics, drugs
or biological drugs and pesticides”; and 3) an expansion of funding for
research “to learn more about the effects of chemical exposure on human
health and the environment, as well as to provide the necessary means to
measure the success of actions to control or reduce risks.” This included
the highly-publicized banning of one phthalate plasticizer, Bisphenol
A (BPA), used in hard plastic vessels such as baby bottles and re-usable
water bottles. Other phthalates remain on the market and are found in
personal care products (i.e. cosmetics and shampoo), though as of 1998
there has been a voluntary withdrawal of two phthalates from products
intended to be consumed or mouthed by young children. New regulations
implemented in 2011 have since restricted the “advertising, sale and
importation of toys and child care articles composed of vinyl containing
phthalates” containing higher than regulated levels of any of six common
phthalates. The regulation of toxic household chemicals in Canada, and
particularly the CMP, has not included consistent requirements – leaving
some chemicals on the market long after there is consensus about their
toxicity while others are quickly banned – and has raised questions about
whether government or industry should take on the onus for assessing
harm. See Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers Regulations, SOR/2008218, s 7(1); Dayna Nadine Scott, “Beyond BPA: We Need to Get
Tough on Toxics,” Women & Environments Network Magazine 88/89 (1
October 2011) 43; Government of Canada, Overview of the Chemicals
Management Plan (2006), online: Government of Canada <http://www.
chemicalsubstanceschimiques.gc.ca/fact-fait/overview-vue-eng.php>;
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are increasingly expected to manage their exposure, mitigating risk by
following the advice of experts and making smart choices about the
products they buy and use.19 Advice about how to reduce exposures to
BFRs includes, for example, replacing mattresses and sofas that are coated
with BFRs with products that are not, or dusting and vacuuming more
frequently to reduce exposures to contaminated house dust.20 Advice
about reducing exposure to phthalates includes paying attention to
labelling to avoid products containing phthalates, more frequent cleaning
of the home, and engaging in food preparation that avoids phthalatecontaminated food-products and food-preparation products. For both
groups of chemicals, the dominant means through which exposures can
be avoided is household labour that most often falls to women: food
preparation, household shopping, and cleaning.21
The individualized need to avoid exposures is particularly problematic
for pregnant women, who are already expected to make choices that
optimize the health of their future child by avoiding certain behaviours
(i.e. stressful activities, smoking, excessive weight gain)22 and products
(i.e. raw fish, alcohol, caffeine, unpasteurized dairy)23 linked to fetal
harm. Chemical exposure is particularly suspect given that “chemicals
in pregnant women can cross the placenta, and in some cases, such as
with methyl mercury, can accumulate in the fetus, resulting in higher
fetal exposure than maternal exposure” and is, in many cases, associated

19.

20.

21.
22.
23.

Phthalates Regulations, SOR/2010-298, s 2.
Norah MacKendrick, The Individualization of Risk as Responsibility
and Citizenship: A Case Study of Chemical Body Burdens (PhD Soc
Thesis, University of Toronto Graduate Department of Sociology,
2012) [unpublished, archived at https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/
handle/1807/31850] at 36.
Robyn Lee & Dayna Nadine Scott, “(Not) Shopping Our Way to Safety”
(30 April 2014), online: Canadian Women’s Health Network <http://
www.cwhn.ca/en/node/46308>.
Ibid; MacKendrick, supra note 19 at 42.
See for example, Public Health Agency of Canada, The Sensible Guide to a
Healthy Pregnancy (Ottawa: Public Health Agency of Canada, 2008).
Ibid. See also “Tips For a Healthy Pregnancy,” online: Eat Right Ontario
<https://www.eatrightontario.ca/en/Articles/Pregnancy/Tips-for-ahealthy-pregnancy.aspx>.
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with adverse “reproductive and developmental health outcomes.”24 The
exceptional onus of protecting fetal health falls to pregnant women
through their behaviours and consumption practices, even when
exposures may be difficult to prevent, either due to the ubiquity of
household chemicals or the social, temporal, and economic challenges of
avoiding exposures. Responsibility for chemical exposures, and especially
fetal exposures, largely falls to women as mothers, pregnant women, or as
hypothetical mothers-to-be.25
This “precautionary consumption,” – that is to say, the expectation
that consumers should educate themselves about how to selectively
choose the products they bring into their home as a means to minimize
toxic exposures – works to individualize risk, putting the responsibility
of reducing exposures to household chemicals on consumers, largely
women, tasked with household management.26 The burdens of
precautionary consumption are not only disproportionately placed
on women (particularly on pregnant women), but also on women of
lower socio-economic status as both exposures and resources (i.e. time,
financial capacity) differ substantially among those of higher and lower
socio-economic status. Precautionary consumption works to shift a
collective concern – the toxic chemicals in consumer products and in
the environment – and to put the responsibility for reducing exposures
on individuals, primarily women, through their engagement with a free
market in household chemicals.
Beyond legislative, regulatory, and market-based attempts to mitigate
the harms of chemical exposures, there exists limited jurisprudence
addressing environmental chemical exposures. This body of law has
focused largely on “toxic torts” that, like precautionary consumption,
also frame harm as a matter of individual responsibility and injury rather
than a matter of collective and public health. In both individual and
class-action claims, physiological harms are often too vaguely linked to
chemical exposures and, when exposures occur over a long period of time,
24.

25.
26.

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee
on Health Care for Underserved Women & American Society for
Reproductive Medicine Practice Committee, supra note 2 at 3.
Lee & Scott, supra note 20.
Ibid.
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the potential impact of other factors is too great to establish causation. In
short, these cases have been largely unsuccessful due to the challenging
nature of establishing causation in negligence and the complex, diffuse
nature of exposure. While toxic household chemicals are ubiquitous and
suspected of causing significant physiological harm, there are few avenues
for legal remedy. Making claims about harms caused by exposures to
household chemicals is particularly challenging when those whose health
is harmed are not only existing individuals, but also non-existent, that is
to say, future people.
Individual and class-action toxic tort claims in Canada have had
little success to date. In contrast, a rich jurisprudence has developed
in Canada regarding reproductive harms. These cases cover numerous
factual contexts, including (but not limited to): medical malpractice;
assisted reproductive technologies; women’s conduct during pregnancy;
pharmaceutical drug development; motor vehicle accidents; and violence
against pregnant women. As noted above, emergent science is linking
exposures to household chemicals to specific reproductive harms. The
links between BFRs and phthalates and adverse male reproductive
health described above27 suggest that exposures to household chemicals
are a different sort of toxic tort. That is, they are not merely a matter
of environmental or health law, but may also fall under jurisprudence
governing reproduction. Harms caused by exposures to household
chemicals could be framed at once as matters of toxicity and reproduction
and, given the problematic record of case law in Canada regarding toxicity,
there might be greater potential for successful litigation if claims were
articulated in terms of reproductive or birth torts rather than toxic torts.
Characterizing reproductive harms incurred by exposures to household
chemicals as a matter of reproductive harm first, and of toxicity second,
allows for lines of analysis developed in cases of reproductive injury to
be applied to the case of chemical exposures. This line of argumentation
at once addresses the need for flexibility in establishing causation of
prenatal harms and the need to protect women’s reproductive autonomy
in the governance of pregnancy (and conception).
This paper identifies the relevance of legal approaches to reproductive
27.

Akutsu et al, supra note 8 at 349.
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harm in Canadian law to the case of harm caused by exposures to
household chemicals prior to birth. It examines the broad history of
reproductive torts in Canada – namely personal injury claims, “birth
torts” (i.e. wrongful pregnancy, birth, and life claims), and preconception
claims – identifying in turn the jurisprudential principles that may be
applied to cases where the tortious act involves exposures to household
chemicals prior to birth. To do so, the paper begins with a brief discussion
of the harms caused by exposures to toxic chemicals, including household
chemicals, identifying the limited potential for arguing causation in
Canadian toxic tort cases. It then turns to its main purpose, providing an
overview of reproductive torts beginning with the most straightforward
type of case, namely, prenatal injury claims. These claims are highly
analogous to “ordinary” personal injury cases, the main difference being
that the claimant is in utero at the time of his or her injury. This section
of the paper also examines prenatal injury claims in which the child sues
his or her own mother with respect to her prenatal conduct. This type of
claim most clearly illustrates the concern over women’s autonomy that
permeates reproductive tort. In its third section, the paper examines “birth
torts,” in which the alleged harm itself is the birth of an unwanted child.
It examines three classes of birth torts, namely “wrongful conception,”
“wrongful birth,” and “wrongful life” cases, though these categories are
highly contested.28 These cases highlight the struggle to recognize the
rights of parents to reproductive autonomy while also recognizing the
value of the lives of children. In section four, the paper examines cases of
prenatal injury where the negligence is alleged to have occurred not while
the child was in utero, but prior to conception. This type of claim raises
several concerns centering on the feasibility of imposing a duty toward
one who does not yet exist. In its fifth section, the paper examines cases
that defy the neat characterizations set out above, including cases where
both prenatal injury claims or preconception injury claims and “birth
torts” are at issue. The paper concludes by identifying that although tort
law is limited in its ability to address harms potentially caused by prenatal
and preconception exposures to household chemicals, reproductive torts
offer important insights useful to developing a more robust approach to
28.

See discussion of this categorization below at note 146.

88

Cattapan, Mykitiuk & Pioro, Notions of Reproductive Harm

addressing intergenerational reproductive harm.

II.

Chemical Exposures and Toxic Torts

Research has long demonstrated that exposure to a wide variety of
chemicals in sufficient dosage can have detrimental health effects.29
Canadians are exposed to an array of “known and suspected carcinogens,
hormone disruptors, developmental toxins and neurotoxins” due to
their presence in consumer products, the food and water supply, soil,
and in minute quantities, the environment.30 Indeed, these chemicals
are everywhere. Recent attention has been paid to chemicals that alter
the development of the reproductive system or that may interfere with
the endocrine system when exposures occur in utero, resulting in adverse
results for sperm and oocyte development, low birth weight, congenital
anomalies, premature birth, and other adverse effects.31
The known and suspected effects of specific chemical exposures
are particularly important to examine in the legal context due to their
intergenerational effects and the complex nature of any potential litigation.
BFRs and phthalates, for example, are suspected to have adverse effects
on both male and female development of the reproductive tract when
exposures occur in utero, based on findings in rodent studies.32 Although
the human health effects of BFRs (as mentioned above) are unknown,
epidemiological studies have suggested that there are adverse effects on
the male reproductive system including reduced testis size and reduced
sperm concentration. The endocrine system may also be affected, as
epidemiological studies have shown changes in hormone levels associated

29.

30.
31.

32.

Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed
with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Government Services Canada, 1993) at
268.
Lynda Collins & Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, “Toxic Battery: A Tort for
our Time?” (2008) 16 Tort Law Rev 131 at 131.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee
on Health Care for Underserved Women & American Society for
Reproductive Medicine Practice Committee, supra note 2 at 933.
Martinez-Arguelles et al, supra note 12; Fisher et al, supra note 13 at
1383; Hannas, supra note 15 at 206.
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with exposures to certain BFRs.33 With respect to phthalates, both human
and animal studies have suggested that in utero exposures may result in
reduced anogenital distance and cryptorchidism.34
Prenatal and preconception exposures are of particular interest in
regards to BFRs and phthalates due to the suspected transgenerational
effects of these chemicals. Both BFRs and phthalates are known
endocrine-disrupting chemicals, that is, chemicals that interfere with
normal hormone action in the body and consequently disrupt cell
metabolism, “reproduction, development, or behaviour.”35 Perhaps the
best-known example is that of diethylstilbestrol (or DES),36 a longprescribed synthetic estrogen that was used to prevent miscarriages in
cases of high-risk pregnancy. Adverse health outcomes of exposure to DES
emerged over time, particularly for female offspring exposed in utero,
including a high occurrence of a rare form of vaginal cancer, reduced
fertility, high rates of ectopic pregnancy, increased breast cancer, and
early menopause, amongst others.37 Early research on third generation
DES offspring suggests adverse health outcomes for the children of those
exposed in utero including “penile and testicular anomalies” such as high
rates of cryptorchidism38 in male offspring; delayed menarche in female
offspring;39 and skeletal and heart anomalies in both male and female
offspring.40 The case of DES illustrates that the implications of exposure
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.

40.

Meeker et al, supra note 9 at 3428.
Swan, supra note 17 at 179.
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, SC 1999, c 33, s 43 [CEPA].
See discussion below at note 199.
Sheela Sathyanarayana et al, “Environmental Exposures: How to Counsel
Preconception and Prenatal Patients in the Clinical Setting” (2012)
207:6 American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecolology 463 at 468;
D Andrew Crain et al, “Female Reproductive Disorders: The Roles of
Endocrine-Disrupting Compounds and Developmental Timing” (2008)
90:4 Fertility and Sterility 911 at 912; Nicolas Kalfa et al, “Prevalence
of Hypospadias in Grandsons of Women Exposed to Diethylstilbestrol
During Pregnancy: A Multigenerational National Cohort Study” (2011)
95:8 Fertility and Sterility 2574 at 2574.
Kalfa et al, ibid.
Linda Titus-Ernstoff et al, “Menstrual and Reproductive Characteristics
of Women Whose Mothers Were Exposed In Utero to Diethylstilbestrol
(DES)” (2006) 35:4 International Journal of Epidemiology 862.
Linda Titus-Ernstoff et al, “Birth Defects in the Sons and Daughters of
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may extend far beyond the person immediately exposed, to their child in
utero as well as to their grandchildren yet-to-be-conceived.
Research on other endocrine disrupters is increasingly demonstrating
links between exposures and transgenerational reproductive outcomes
recalling the effects of DES. For example, studies demonstrate that rats
exposed to certain endocrine disrupters (namely the pesticide vinclozolin)
known to cause altered fertility have passed anomalies “down to nearly
every male in subsequent generations.”41 There is also reason to believe
that such effects may be occurring in the case of BFRs, as animal studies
have shown that exposing American male kestrels to certain BFRs has
multigenerational effects on reproductive success.42 With respect to
phthalates, recent research has demonstrated that following exposure
of mice in utero, “abnormal testicular function” persisted in subsequent
generations, amongst other anomalies.43
While scholars are continuing to study the transgenerational effects

41.

42.

43.

Women Who Were Exposed In Utero to Diethylstilbestrol (DES)” (2010)
33:2 International Journal of Andrology 377.
Matthew D Anway et al, “Epigenetic Transgenerational Actions of
Endocrine Disruptors and Male Fertility” (2005) 308:5727 Science
1466; Jocelyn Kaiser, “Endocrine Disrupters Trigger Fertility Problems in
Multiple G fenerations” (2005) 308:5727 Science 1391 at 1391.
Sarah C Marteinson et al, “Multi-generational Effects of Polybrominated
Diphenylethers Exposure: Embryonic Exposure of Male American
Kestrels (Falco Sparverius) to DE-71 Alters Reproductive Success and
Behaviors” (2010) 29:8 Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 1740;
Kim J Fernie et al, “Changes in Reproductive Courtship Behaviors of
Adult American Kestrels (Falco sparverius) Exposed to Environmentally
Relevant Levels of the Polybrominated Diphenyl Ether Mixture,
DE-71” (2008) 102:1 Toxicological Sciences 171; Kim J Fernie et al,
“Environmentally Relevant Concentrations of DE-71 and HBCD Alter
Eggshell Thickness and Reproductive Success of American Kestrels”
(2009) 43:6 Environmental Science & Technology 2124.
Timothy J Doyle et al, “Transgenerational Effects of Di-(2-ethylhexyl)
Phthalate on Testicular Germ Cell Associations and Spermatogonial Stem
Cells in Mice” (2013) 88:5 Biology of Reproduction 1 at 10.
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of phthalates and BFRs in both human44 and animal45 populations,
the data is emergent and far from conclusive. Moreover, determining
causation of any such effects is particularly difficult given the inconsistent
nature of findings in both human and animal studies. Further, exposures
to household chemicals typically occur in ways that are diffuse and
cumulative, that is to say, emergent from innumerable sources and
occurring over a long period of time. Simply put, it is difficult to establish
the cause of chemical exposures when the science remains unclear and,
furthermore, when we are always already exposed. Exposures may also
predate conception and birth, insofar as one’s exposure may affect the
health of one’s child not yet conceived, in utero, or the offspring of the
child in utero (or the child yet-to-be-conceived).
Despite the known and suspected reproductive harms caused by
exposure to household chemicals, litigation has been limited. In the
Canadian context, there are very few cases that address reproductive harm
in relation to exposures to household chemicals, in part because of the
challenge of establishing a cause-and-effect relationship between chemical
exposures and physiological harm. The criminal justice system offers few
opportunities for litigation where harm is incurred due to exposures
to household chemicals, and tort law (most often through claims of
negligence) has been the site where relevant jurisprudence has been
developed. However, toxic tort jurisprudence has not seen much success,
either as individual or class action claims. Two successful cases of toxic
exposures associated with individual harm are Leibel v South Qu’Appelle
(Rural Municipality)46 and MacDonald v Sebastian,47 both cases of arsenic44.

45.

46.
47.

See for example Chanley M Small et al, “Reproductive Outcomes Among
Women Exposed to a Brominated Flame Retardant In Utero” (2011)
66:4 Archives of Environmental & Occupational Health 201. See also
Donatella Caserta et al, “The Influence of Endocrine Disruptors in a
Selected Population of Infertile Women” (2013) 29:5 Gynecological
Endocrinology 444.
See for example Rylee Phuong Do et al, “Non-monotonic Dose Effects
of In Utero Exposure to Di(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate (DEHP) on Testicular
and Serum Testosterone and Anogenital Distance in Male Mouse Fetuses”
(2012) 34:4 Reproductive Toxicology 614.
[1944] 1 DLR 369 (Sask CA) [Leibel].
(1987), 81 NSR (2d) 189 (SC(TD)) [MacDonald].
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tainted drinking water. In Leibel, the plaintiff was “poisoned with deeply
injurious results” by drinking well water that had been contaminated
with arsenic due to the negligent mixing of grasshopper poison-bait
by the municipality taking place nearby.48 The plaintiff suffered “much
pain and nausea”; “lost … use of his hands and feet”; impaired “bodily
functions”; and a deterioration of his general “condition of health.”49
In MacDonald, a landlord did not disclose the toxic levels of arsenic in
the water supply of his tenants, despite prior knowledge.50 The plaintiffs
argued that the landlord had a duty to disclose the levels of arsenic, and
Justice Burchell, finding that the actions of the defendant were therefore
negligent, awarded damages. The causation in this case was very clear,
with the plaintiffs experiencing flu-like symptoms, nausea, cramps, and
diarrhoea (which are conclusively linked to arsenic poisoning) following
consumption of the toxic water supply.51
Though reproductive harms were not explicitly at issue, both Leibel
and MacDonald offer examples of the type of negligence claim regarding
toxic exposures likely to succeed in Canadian jurisprudence. Negligence
claims rely on four requirements for a successful claim, namely the
establishment of duty on the part of the defendant, a breach of said duty,
a causal connection between the breach of duty and the harm incurred,
and real material damage, injury or harm.52 Causation is integral here,
and the near-immediacy of the harms and the direct relationship between
arsenic poisoning and the plaintiffs’ health effects made the tortious
actions relatively easy to establish. Unlike in utero or preconception
exposures to household chemicals, the plaintiffs were either children or
adults harmed directly by exposures associated with the negligence of
the defendant, causation was clear and direct, and the effects were nearly
immediate.53
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Supra note 46 at para 1.
Ibid at para 9.
Supra note 47 at paras 1, 3.
Ibid at para 6.
J A Jolowicz & T Ellis Lewis, Winfield on Tort, 8th ed (London: Sweet &
Maxwell,1967) at 42 ff.
Other cases where injury in negligence is limited to a single or smallgroup exposed to toxics have generally been dismissed due to a lack of
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Where intergenerational harm has been claimed, cases have been
dismissed due to an inability to demonstrate clear causation. For
example, in the case of Martin (Litigation guardian of ) v Glaze-Bloc
Products Inc,54 an employee of Glaze-Bloc Products Inc. was exposed
to trichloroethylene, a synthetic chemical most often used in industrial
cleaning and in some household products.55 This exposure was alleged
to cause the neural tube anomaly experienced by the infant plaintiff, the
employee’s child.56 However, while Glaze-Bloc Products was found to be
at fault for the chemical exposures experienced by Tom Martin, Justice
Morin found that there was not “valid evidence to support a cause and
effect relationship between”57 the chemical exposures and the “neural
tube defects” of the child.58 The significant challenge of establishing
causation in cases of environmental exposures is particularly apparent
in Martin as the possibility that factors and exposures other than that
which occurred due to the actions of Glaze-Bloc Products Inc., as well
as the limitations of existing research on the chemical in question,
undermined the capacity of the plaintiffs to demonstrate concretely a
direct relationship between cause and effect.59 Given that tort law has
conventionally required the plaintiff to demonstrate the likelihood that
the defendant’s actions or inactions resulted in the injuries in question,
in many cases the multifactorial nature of reproductive harm, the diffuse
nature of chemical exposures, and the lack of substantive scientific
support to make direct evidentiary causal claims, make causation in cases

54.
55.

56.
57.
58.
59.

Col, [1998] BCJ No 1944 (QL) (SC); Guimond Estate v Fiberglas Canada
Inc (1999), 221 NBR (2d) 118 (CA); Canada v Grenier, 2005 FCA 348;
Stucke v Richard McDonald & Associates Ltd, 2006 ABQB 239; MacIntyre
v Cape Breton District Health Authority, 2009 NSSC 202.
2007 CarswellOnt 9457 (WL Can) (Sup Ct) [Martin].
Environment Canada Government of Canada, “Environment Canada
- Pollution and Waste – Trichloroethylene” (13 August 2009), online:
Environment Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca/toxiques-toxics/Default.
asp?lang=En&n=98E80CC6-1&xml=8E5CDE87-0226-4C47-BADC161ED8A72654>.
Martin, supra note 54 at para 1.
Ibid at para 73.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 131.
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like Martin nearly impossible to prove.60
Class action toxic torts in Canada have been limited by the
difficulties of acquiring class certification, though the benefits of
pursuing such claims in cases of exposures to environmental toxins are
clear. In all claims of toxic torts, the cost, difficulty of identifying the
time and place of long-term exposures, and limited scientific evidence
substantiating cause and effect too often preclude success in cases where
the tort of negligence is argued.61 Class action suits offer the opportunity
for plaintiffs to pool their resources in cases “where complexity and
expert scientific evidence make conflicting findings likely and individual
litigation virtually impossible to afford.”62 Further, for the courts, class
actions allow for limited judicial resources to be more economically used
in cases where the facts are essentially the same, in order to “improve
access to justice by making economical the prosecution of claims that any
one class member would find too costly to prosecute on his or her own,”
and enable claims substantial enough to require “actual and potential
wrongdoers” to change their behaviours to reduce or eliminate the “harm
they are causing, or might cause, to the public.”63
However, following Patrick Hayes, there has been a too-narrow
understanding of causation in class action claims regarding toxic exposures
that has limited success in establishing class-action certification.64 Hayes
identifies the case of Hollick v Toronto (City) as establishing a restrictive
framework in recognizing mass toxic torts that set the stage for future
refusals to grant certification in environmental torts claims. In Hollick, the
plaintiff claimed that the “noise and physical pollution”65 from a nearby
landfill were excessive, making a class action nuisance claim on behalf
60.
61.

62.

63.
64.
65.

Jocelyn Kaiser, “Endocrine Disrupters Trigger Fertility Problems in
Multiple Generations” (2005) 308:5727 Science 1391 at 1391.
Patrick Hayes, “Exploring the Viability of Class Actions Arising from
Environmental Toxic Torts: Overcoming Barriers to Certification” (2009)
19:3 J Envtl L & Prac 189 at 190.
Heather McCleod-Kilmurray, “Hollick and Environmental Class Actions:
Putting the Substance into Class Action Procedure” (2002) 34 Ottawa L
Rev 263 at 283.
Hollick v Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68 at para 15 [Hollick].
Supra note 61.
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of 30,000 residents living near the landfill. The motions judge certified
a class action, but the class certification was overturned in Divisional
Court “on the grounds that the appellant had not stated an identifiable
class and had not satisfied the commonality requirement.”66 Essentially,
each of the individual plaintiffs would have differently experienced the
nuisance dependant on various factors, including their proximity to
the landfill.67 The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal. The
limitations placed on class certification were also made clear in Ring v
Canada68 in which it was alleged that “the spraying of herbicides” near
the Gagetown military base from 1956 onward “materially contributed
to or materially contributed to the risk of causing, lymphoma”69 for the
plaintiffs. Though the trial judge found that the certification for a class
action had been met, on appeal Justice Cameron found for the court that
the class was too broadly conceived, as it included not only those who
were exposed to toxic chemicals at Gagetown after 1956, but also those
“who claim to”70 have been exposed. For Cameron JA, no acceptable
limits to the class of those claiming exposure were applied, and therefore
class certification could not be accorded.
In contrast, in Smith v Inco Limited,71 certification for a toxic torts
case was granted. Initially, certification was denied by Justice Nordheimer
at the Ontario Superior Court of Justice as the geographic boundaries of
contamination were “arbitrary” (i.e. including people without claims and
excluding people with relevant claims).72 On appeal, class certification
was granted, but only once the class was narrowed from the broader class
of those who experienced physiological harms alleged to be caused by
exposures to certain “toxic and carcinogenic chemicals”73 to extend only
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Ibid at para 8.
Ibid at para 32.
2010 NLCA 20.
Ibid at para 1.
Ibid at para 71.
2011 ONCA 628 [Smith].
Pearson v Inco Ltd (2002), 33 CPC (5th) 264 at para 101 (Ont Sup Ct).
There has been greater success in toxic tort class action suits under Droite
Civile in Quebec. See St Lawrence Cement v Barrette, 2008 SCC 64; and
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to those whose property values were adversely affected. The claim on the
merits failed at the Court of Appeal.74
The poor record of litigation vis-à-vis exposures to synthetic chemicals
in Canada has not precluded scholars from theorizing how such tort
actions might be undertaken. Though harms caused by exposures to
synthetic chemicals have most often been articulated as negligence claims,
Lynda Collins and Heather McLeod-Kilmurray imagine how Canadians,
exposed to a wide variety of chemicals without their consent, might
be able to make a claim of “toxic battery.” “Toxic battery,” they argue,
occurs in “any battery in which the alleged intentional contact takes the
form of exposure to a toxic substance released by the defendant.”75 If
battery is “the intentional application of harmful or offensive contact”
with the plaintiff’s person,76 and intent need not be specific or desired,
but merely relies on any consequences that result from the defendant’s
conduct (following the doctrine of constructive intent),77 it follows that
those responsible for exposing plaintiffs to synthetic chemicals might be
understood as committing battery.
Collins and McLeod-Kilmurray identify the potential utility of
battery in toxic torts in part as a means to circumvent the challenge
posed by establishing causation in claims of negligence. As in Martin,
due to the limitations of existing scientific research on the effects of
environmental exposures to synthetic chemicals, and further, because
of the often diffuse nature of exposure, causation has been too difficult
to establish, rendering negligence claims a losing proposition. As
battery relies on the idea that there is “harmful or offensive contact”78
experienced by the plaintiff, in which there is some sort of incursion
on their person that violates their dignity regardless of the harm, “toxic
battery” engenders an understanding that the harm is the exposure in and
of itself, rather than any specific physiological effects. However, as these
authors identify, given the widespread nature of chemical exposures, the
claim that individuals are subject to battery when involuntarily exposed
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Smith, supra note 71.
Collins & McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 30 at 132.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 143.
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to synthetic chemicals could ostensibly be applied to nearly everyone in
the industrial world, if not elsewhere. The overly broad scope of toxic
battery, then, suggests that it is unlikely to be successful as a strategy to
address cases of environmental exposures to synthetic chemicals, though
it is particularly useful in its capacity to sidestep the issue of causation
that hinders relevant negligence claims.
Rather than theorize toxic torts as battery, Dayna Scott suggests that
the preoccupation of tort law with proof of physical damages experienced
by individuals impedes justice. Scott interrogates the relationship between
tort law and the body, identifying that the association between physical
damage experienced by individuals is too limited an understanding of
harm to provide a remedy in the case of toxic torts. Scott argues that if
tort law is a means to address the harms incurred by one individual (or
group) at the hands of another, tort law is insufficient to engage with
harms caused by toxic chemicals as it is “blind to the public dimensions
of the problem and the way that state law, through the regulatory design,
shapes the behaviour of key actors, notably in this case, polluters.”79
Addressing the adverse effects of household chemicals as a matter of tort
law inherently frames exposure as a private matter when rightly, for Scott,
it is a matter of public health, public interest, and state responsibility.
Nevertheless, toxic torts continue to be used to address matters
of chemical exposure with limited success. The challenges of proving
causation of adverse health effects are often insurmountable for plaintiffs,
particularly in cases that are not class-action matters and when the harms
are claimed as a matter of negligence. Causation is even more difficult
to prove in toxic torts cases when, as in Martin, reproductive harms
(particularly those that occur prior to conception) are alleged.80 However,
as research on phthalates and BFRs increasingly demonstrates there are
links between in utero exposures and reproductive harm, exposures to
household chemicals might be thought of both as a toxic tort and as
a matter of reproductive harm. As toxic torts claims have largely been
unsuccessful in the Canadian context, partly due to the problematic
79.
80.

Dayna Nadine Scott, “‘Gender-benders’: Sex and Law in the Constitution
of Polluted Bodies” (2009) 17:3 Fem Legal Stud 241 at 260.
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nature of establishing causation, cases in which reproductive harms are
associated with household chemicals might instead look to reproductive
torts as a line of argumentation. Reproductive torts (i.e. prenatal injury
claims, birth torts, and preconception claims) may offer a point of entry
for litigation addressing reproductive harms caused by exposures to
household chemicals.

III.

Reproductive Torts

A.

Prenatal Injury Claims

Prenatal injury claims occur when the tortious act harms or is alleged to
have harmed a child in utero. These cases can be roughly categorized in
two different ways. First, prenatal injury claims may be made when the
harm incurred is alleged to be caused by a breach of duty on the part of
the defendant. In these cases, the driver of a motor vehicle (as in early
cases) or health services workers (i.e. physicians, nurses) breach a duty
of care resulting in the alleged harms to the fetus. The second type of
prenatal injury claim is that in which a pregnant woman is liable for the
tortious action. In these particularly controversial cases, a woman in some
way harms herself (accidentally or otherwise), and alleged harm to her
fetus is the result of her action. Both types of claims are discussed below
to demonstrate the theorization of fetal harm, liability, and causation in
prenatal injury negligence cases as a means to identify the utility of these
approaches for potential litigation regarding reproductive harms caused
by in utero exposures to household chemicals.
In Canada, the earliest precedents relating to reproductive harm
occurred in the case of accidents involving motor vehicles. Though
decided under Quebec’s civil law, the 1933 Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Montreal Tramways Co v Léveillé 81 featured a common law
analysis, and it has served as a precedent in later common law decisions.
In this case, a pregnant woman was “descending from a tram car” when,
“by reason of the negligence” of the employee of the appellant (the
“motorman”), she fell and was injured; her child was born with “club

81.

[1933] SCR 456 [Montreal Tramways].
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feet.”82 At issue was whether the available evidence allowed the jury to
reasonably find that the fall caused the child’s club feet, and whether
the child, while in utero, was covered by Article 1053 of the civil code,
which read, “[e]very person capable of discerning right from wrong is
responsible for the damage caused by his fault to another, whether by
positive act, imprudence, neglect or want of skill.”83
The majority judgment, written by Justice Lamont, surveys UK,
Irish, and American precedent on the legal status of the unborn child,
finding that the common law recognizes the separate existence of the
unborn child for inheritance and criminal law purposes, provided that
the child is subsequently born alive. The judgment goes on to state that
existing common law authority does not apply this rule in personal
injury cases, but that the civil law employs a legal fiction wherein it
treats a conceived but unborn child as having been born at a particular
time for his or her benefit, if subsequently born alive. With respect to
causation, Lamont J held that the medical expert testimony arguing that
the cause of club feet was unknown did not negate the testimony of
the experts who believed it was very probable that the accident caused
the child’s condition, and consequently, the jury could reasonably have
found a causal relationship.84 Beyond addressing and accepting the
vague probability of causation, the result of the majority decision was a
precedent-setting judgment that effectively determined the retrospective
application of negligence in utero, as long as the child was born alive.
The logic of Montreal Tramways would be put to use in the Ontario
case of Duval et al v Seguin et al,85 the Canadian common law precedentsetting case on tort recovery for injuries sustained while in utero. The facts
concerned a motor vehicle accident involving several individuals, one of
whom was thirty-one weeks pregnant at the time, and whose child was
born prematurely about three weeks later.86 The High Court described
that the child was “permanently handicapped both physically and
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Ibid at 458.
Ibid at 459.
Montreal Tramways, ibid at 473.
(1973) 1 OR (2d) 482 (CA) [Duval 1973], aff’g [1972] 2 OR 686 (H Ct
J) [Duval 1972].
Duval 1972, ibid at para 32.
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mentally”87 as a result of “brain injuries suffered in the accident.”88 The
judgments of the High Court and the Court of Appeal, both of which
allowed recovery by the infant plaintiff, referred to American,89 Irish,90
and Australian91 authorities promoting recovery for injuries sustained
while en ventre sa mère. The High Court judgment, echoing Montreal
Tramways, notes:
In my opinion it is not necessary in the present case to consider whether the
unborn child was a person in law or at which stage she became a person. For
negligence to be a tort there must be damages. While it was the foetus or child
en ventre sa mère who was injured, the damages sued for are the damages
suffered by the plaintiff Ann since birth and which she will continue to suffer
as a result of that injury.92

The High Court dismissed the argument that the difficulty in proving
causation in prenatal injury cases justified barring such claims, suggesting
that though older cases were invested in the difficulty of establishing
causation, “scientific advances”93 suggest that the relationship between
certain acts and prenatal injuries are stronger than ever. The High Court
also addressed the issue of causation by referring to the then-landmark
case of Donoghue v Stevenson,94 writing that “[u]nder the doctrine of
M’Alister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson … an unborn child is within
the foreseeable risk incurred by a negligent motorist. When the unborn
child becomes a living person and suffers damages as a result of prenatal
injuries caused by the fault of the negligent motorist the cause of action is
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completed.”95 The court awarded $31,000 to the infant plaintiff and this
award was upheld by the Court of Appeal.96
In Montreal Tramways, the majority decision did not hinge on
causation as conflicting expert witnesses suggested that the child’s club
feet may or may not have been the result of the “motorman’s” negligence.
Further, in Duval the High Court was careful to note that as causation is
difficult to establish in cases of prenatal harms, in cases where there is a
strong correlation between a negligent act and injuries sustained to a child
en ventre sa mère, “plaintiffs should not be denied relief in proper cases
because of possible difficulties of proof.”97 In short, though causation
is a critical element of negligence claims, at least in the case of prenatal
injuries related to motor vehicles causation is inherently tenuous and a
failure to establish clear causation has not always prevented successful
claims.98
While accidents involving motor vehicles are one of the earliest
scenarios in which prenatal injury claims were made in Canada, prenatal
personal injury is also often litigated in scenarios involving labour and
delivery. Numerous court decisions feature plaintiffs who allege that
negligent care they and their mothers received in the hours, minutes or
seconds prior to their birth resulted in severe injury.99 In light of the
95.
96.
97.
98.
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Duval 1972, supra note 85 at para 71.
Ibid at para 72; Duval 1973, supra note 85 at para 11.
Duval 1972, ibid at para 70.
In addition to Montreal Tramways and Duval, the case of LaForge v McGee
et al involves a fact scenario in which a pregnant woman is involved in
a motor vehicle accident and her child, subsequently born alive, is born
with disabilities. In this case, causation was relatively easily established
through medical testimony and a very direct temporal relationship
between the motor vehicle accident and pregnant woman’s symptoms
(associated with the harm incurred by the infant plaintiff). In this case,
causation was seen to be direct and relatively simple for Justice Wood. See
Laforge v McGee, [1988] BCJ No 1584 (QL) (SC).
See e.g. Preston v Chow, 2007 MBQB 318 [Preston]; Crawford (Litigation
guardian of ) v Penney (2004), 26 CCLT (3d) 246 (CA) [Crawford];
Tsur-Shofer v Grynspan (2004). 131 ACWS (3d) 545 (Sup Ct); Fullerton
(Guardian ad litem of ) v Delair, 2005 BCSC 204; Brito (Guardian
ad litem of ) v Woolley, 2003 BCCA 397 (claim unsuccessful); Meyer
v Gordon (1981), 17 CCLT 1 (SC); Bauer (Litigation guardian of ) v
Seager, 2000 MBQB 113 [Bauer]; Anderson v Salvation Army Maternity
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consequences of prenatal injury, which may include the need for constant
care and a lifetime’s worth of lost earnings, damages in these types of cases
often run into the millions of dollars.100 Care providers that have been
found liable for providing negligent prenatal care include obstetricians101
and other attending physicians;102 medical residents;103 nurses;104 and
midwives.105 Hospitals have also been found liable for negligence.106
These cases rely on the premise that care providers owe a duty of
care to both the pregnant woman and unborn child during pregnancy, as
well as during labour and delivery.107 Further, there must be some causal
link between the actions of the care providers and the harm incurred by
the plaintiff. For example, the claim might be made that inadequate care
in response to a high-risk pregnancy led to oxygen deprivation during
labour causing the child to be born with “extensive and permanent brain
injuries.”108 In addition, plaintiffs might claim that the failure to perform
a caesarean section or refer to a specialist when raised led to a child being

100.
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affected by the herpes virus.109
Taken together, the motor vehicle and prenatal care cases discussed
to this point illustrate the emergence and entrenchment of the right of
the child born alive to sue for damages sustained before birth. Further, as
a group these cases, and particularly those cases of fetal harm involving
motor vehicle accidents, suggest that causation need not always be direct
and clear. Causation, as in Preston and Crawford cited above, may be
inferred from a breach of duty marked by inaction, or as in Montreal
Tramways and Duval, may be based on perceived probability of harm
following an injurious event (motor vehicle collision). The challenge of
determining causation with certainty in cases of prenatal harm need not
stand in the way of a remedy.
In Duval, Justice Fraser outlined the challenges of establishing
causation in cases of prenatal harm, stating the importance of not
dismissing just claims in the absence of the science necessary to prove
causation. He wrote for the court that:
Some of the older cases suggest that there should be no recovery by a person
who has suffered prenatal injuries because of the difficulties of proof and of the
opening it gives for perjury and speculation. Since those cases were decided
there have been many scientific advances and it would seem that chances
of establishing whether or not there are causal relationships between the act
alleged to be negligent and the damage alleged to have been suffered as a
consequence are better now than formerly. In any event the Courts now have
to consider many similar problems and plaintiffs should not be denied relief in
proper cases because of possible difficulties of proof.110

Prenatal claims may, then, offer some hope for cases where prenatal
exposures to household chemicals are at issue. There is a clear history
of negligence claims when fetal harm is linked to a breach of a duty of
care including, at times, where a direct line between cause and effect is
not apparent. This stands in contrast to claims of negligence related to
toxic chemicals which, in the Canadian context, may be dismissed when
causation is either unclear or indirect. Whereas in cases like MacDonald
and Leibel exposure to arsenic was clear and specifically related to
the symptoms experienced by the plaintiffs, in cases like Martin the
109. Preston, supra note 99 at para 193.
110. Duval 1972, supra note 85 at para 70 [emphasis added].
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relationship between chemical exposures and the adverse health effects
were too vague for the claim of negligence to succeed.
In the case of either BFRs or phthalates, there are no clear guidelines
regarding acceptable levels of exposure and bioaccumulation, and, as in
Martin, without such guidelines from scientific or medical communities
it might be difficult to establish a relationship between adverse health
outcomes and chemical exposures for purposes of litigation. The
multifactorial nature of the symptoms that may be associated with
exposures to household chemicals, such as cryptorchidism and low
birth rate, may also raise doubt about the role of chemical exposures
in reproductive health issues that may be experienced by those exposed
in utero. The issue of establishing causation is further exacerbated
by the challenge of finding an identifiable defendant in such cases, as
contemporary Western households typically include a wide variety of
products that contain either BFRs111 or phthalates.112 Furthermore,
due to the ongoing nature of these exposures, there is little possibility
of identifying the particular product or manufacturer to which specific
adverse health effects can be attributed. Establishing direct and clear
causation between exposure to household chemicals and adverse health
effects is unlikely due to the diffuse and pervasive nature of exposures,
compounded by the still-unclear science on the effects of these chemicals,
and the challenges of finding an identifiable plaintiff. If tort action
requires an identifiable defendant, quantifiable damage, and a causal
relationship between the defendant and the harm incurred,113 in the
theoretical cases involving exposures to household chemicals, two out of
the three criteria (i.e. an identifiable defendant, and a causal connection),
are not clearly present.

B.

Prenatal Injury Claims Against Pregnant Women

The second category of prenatal injury claims is that which occurs when a
mother is the tortfeasor and is believed to have caused harms sustained by
111. See text accompanying note 7.
112. See text accompanying note 2.
113. Albert C Lin, “Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental
Toxic Injury” (2005) 78:6 S Cal L Rev 1439 at 1445.

(2015) 1 CJCCL

105

a fetus. These cases are limited in the Canadian context as the Canadian
judiciary has largely been resistant to interfere with women’s reproductive
autonomy, particularly following R v Morgentaler.114 Women are not
typically held liable for risks or harm enacted on a fetus, suggesting that
the governance of pregnancy is a matter of reproductive autonomy, and
should be addressed by public policy rather than judicial intervention.
The case of Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v
DFG115 was critical to establishing the position of non-intervention in
pregnancy taken by the courts in Canada,116 though it considers the
actions of an organization acting on behalf of the interests of a fetus
against a pregnant woman (rather than the in utero exposure to harms
experienced by a child born alive).117 This case involved the attempt of
Winnipeg Child and Family Services to obtain a court order detaining a
pregnant Aboriginal woman who was addicted to sniffing glue, in order to
protect her unborn child from neurological damage.118 The issues before
114. [1988] 1 SCR 30.
115. [1997] 3 SCR 925 [DFG].
116. Roxanne Mykitiuk & Dayna Nadine Scott, “Risky Pregnancy: Liability,
Blame, and Insurance in the Governance of Prenatal Harm” (2010) 43:2
UBC L Rev 311 at 331.
117. See e.g. Melanie Randall, “Pregnant Embodiment and Women’s
Autonomy Rights in Law: An Analysis of the Language and Politics of
Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. D.F.G.” (1999) 62:2 Sask L Rev
515; Sandra Rodgers, “Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. D.F.G.:
Juridical Interference with Pregnant Women in the Alleged Interest of
the Fetus” (1998) 36:3 Alta L Rev 711; FC DeCoste, “Winnipeg Child
and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. D.F.G.: The Impossibility of
Fetal Rights and the Obligations of Judicial Governance” (1998) 36:3
Alta L Rev 725; Laura Shanner, “Pregnancy Intervention and Models of
Maternal-Fetal Relationship: Philosophical Reflections on the Winnipeg
C.F.S. Dissent” (1998) 36:3 Alta L Rev 751; Bruce P Elman & Jill Mason,
“The Failure of Dialogue: Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest
Area) v. G. (D.F.)” (1998) 36:3 Alta L Rev 768; Timothy Caulfield & Erin
Nelson, “Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v DFG:
A Commentary on the Law, Reproductive Autonomy and the Allure of
Technopolicy” (1998) 36:3 Alta L Rev 799; Emilia Ordolis, “Maternal
Substance Abuse and the Limits of Law: A Relational Challenge” (2008)
46:1 Alta L Rev 119; Lorna Weir, Pregnancy, Risk and Biopolitics: On the
Threshold of the Living Subject (London, UK: Routledge, 2006) at 164;
Mykitiuk & Scott, ibid at 332.
118. DFG, supra note 115 at para 1.
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the Supreme Court of Canada were whether such an order could be
permitted through tort law or through the power of the court to protect
children (“parens patriae jurisdiction”).119 The majority judgment of Chief
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) held that making the major changes
to tort law required to support the order was best left to the legislature.120
Granting legal rights to a fetus could allow the fetus to bring a variety of
causes of action, including seeking an injunction preventing a pregnant
woman from having an abortion.121 The Court would also be required to
conceive of the unborn child and its mother “as separate juristic persons in
a mutually separable and antagonistic relation,” a position that contrasts
both the physical reality and the traditional legal characterization of the
relationship.122 In addition, pregnant women’s lifestyle choices would be
open to outside scrutiny123 and legal action124 which could in turn lead
to a “conflict between the pregnant woman as an autonomous decisionmaker and her fetus.”125 The Court was also concerned that restricting
women’s behaviours in pregnancy might lead to women engaging in risky
activities to avoid medical care.126 The judgment went on to hold that an
119. Ibid at para 9.
120. Ibid at para 20.
121. Ibid at para 24. This had been unsuccessfully attempted in an earlier case
that went before the Supreme Court of Canada. See Tremblay v Daigle,
[1989] 2 SCR 530. As the formalistic analysis of whether the fetus is a
person at law undertaken in that case is subsumed by the broader analysis
in DFG, we do not analyze that case in detail.
122. DFG, ibid at para 29.
123. Ibid at para 42.
124. Ibid at paras 30-45.
125. Ibid at para 37.
126. The dissenting judgment of Justice Major (joined by Justice Sopinka),
supported itself with information submitted by various interveners
before the Court “on the prevalence of mental and physical disabilities
in children as a result of substance abuse by their mothers while
pregnant,” including “evidence focused on the ‘crisis situation’ in many
aboriginal communities.” In concluding that Canadian law does support
a remedy for the claim, Major J’s points include that the born alive rule
originated as an evidentiary presumption that responded to limited
medical knowledge of whether a child in utero was in fact alive at the
time it allegedly suffered injury. As such, present medical technologies
such as ultrasound and fetal heart monitors render the rule “outdated
and indefensible.” With respect to concerns over women’s autonomy,
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injunction cannot support an order for detention,127 and that the power
of parens patriae does not apply to the unborn.128
Two years later, the Court would apply the broad framework
established in DFG – that pregnant women cannot be found liable for
behaviours that might harm their fetus – to a very different fact scenario,
with a slightly different focus. The controversial129 case of Dobson
(Litigation Guardian of ) v Dobson130 raised the question of whether a child
could sue his or her mother for injuries sustained while in utero in a motor
vehicle accident as a result of her negligent driving. The infant plaintiff
Ryan Dobson was delivered prematurely by caesarean section following
the accident and was subsequently found to have “permanent mental and
physical impairment, including cerebral palsy.”131 The majority judgment
written by Justice Cory noted that the pregnant woman, in addition to
fulfilling an important role benefiting society as a whole,132 “is also an
individual whose bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy rights must be
protected.”133 From this perspective, a pregnant woman is fundamentally
different than other defendants insofar as imposing a legal duty to protect

127.
128.
129.

130.
131.
132.
133.

the dissent states that the test for justifying confinement is set at a “very
high threshold.” That is, “[i]t is only in those extreme cases, where the
conduct of the mother has a reasonable probability of causing serious and
irreparable harm to the unborn child, and no other reasonable means of
treatment exists, that a court should assume jurisdiction to intervene.”
Ibid at paras 88, 109, 124, 136.
Ibid at para 46.
Ibid at paras 49-57.
See e.g. Ian R Kerr, “Pregnant Women and the ‘Born Alive’ Rule in
Canada” (2000) 8:1 Tort Law Review 713; Diana Ginn, “A Balancing
that is Beyond the Scope of the Common Law: A Discussion of the Issues
Raised by Dobson (Litigation guardian of ) v. Dobson” (2001) 27:1 Queen’s
LJ 51; Kristin Ali, “Defining the Standard of Prenatal Care: An Analysis
of Judicial and Legislative Responses” (2007) 1:1 McGill JL & Health
69; Diana Ginn, “The Supreme Court of Canada and What It Means
to Be ‘Of Woman Born’” in Andrea O’Reilly, ed, From Motherhood to
Mothering: The Legacy of Adrienne Rich’s Of Woman Born (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2004) 27; Weir, supra note 117 at 88;
Mykitiuk & Scott, supra note 116 at 333.
[1999] 2 SCR 753 [Dobson].
Ibid at para 2.
Ibid at paras 24, 45.
Ibid at para 24.
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the life of a fetus could “render the most mundane decision taken in the
course of her daily life as a pregnant woman subject to the scrutiny of the
courts,”134 infringing substantially on women’s autonomy and privacy.135
These effects would also result from attempting to articulate the standard
of conduct of a “reasonable pregnant woman.”136 Cory J concluded that
public policy concerns indicated that a duty could not be imposed on
pregnant women toward their fetus or subsequently born child, and
remarked that provincial legislatures could create legislation to allow for
insurance provisions to benefit “both the injured child and his or her
family, without unduly restricting the privacy and autonomy rights of
women.”137
The outcome of Dobson was a reiteration and expansion of the
principle established in DFG, namely that attempts to restrict women’s
behaviours in pregnancy through torts (prior to or once the child is born
alive) are untenable, given the infringement on women’s reproductive
autonomy and the problematic nature of differentiating acceptable and
“reasonable” activities from those which might be restricted.138 Dobson
makes clear that women’s bodily integrity and reproductive autonomy
covers all actions that they may take throughout their pregnancy. Other
cases have applied this principle to tort claims against mothers for harms
incurred in utero139 and similar logic has been used in criminal cases.140
Ibid at para 27.
Ibid at para 44.
Ibid at paras 52-53.
Ibid at para 81. Partly as a result of the decision, the province of Alberta
enacted legislation to grant the precise cause of action denied in the
case. The Maternal Tort Liability Act, SA 2005, c M-7.5, reads, in part,
“a mother may be liable to her child for injuries suffered by her child on
or after birth that were caused by the mother’s use or operation of an
automobile during her pregnancy,” and limits liability to “the amount
of insurance money payable under contracts of automobile insurance
indemnifying the mother that the child can recover as a creditor under
s 635 of the Insurance Act.” See ss 1-4. See also Mykitiuk & Scott, supra
note 116 at 339.
138. Ibid at para 52-53.
139. For the application of the principle in Dobson, see for example Hall
(Litigaiton guardian of ) v Kellar, 23 CCLT (3d) 40 (Sup Ct).
140. See e.g. R v Drummond, [1997] OJ No 6390 (QL) (Ct J (Prov Div)),
which involved a charge of attempted murder against a pregnant woman
134.
135.
136.
137.
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Furthermore, Dobson elucidates that while pregnant women are not liable
for injuries sustained by a fetus during pregnancy, this does not preclude
the actions of other defendants. Parties other than the pregnant woman
are liable for damages incurred by the fetus when the child is born alive,
even if the injury is sustained prior to birth.
Overall, the claims of prenatal reproductive injury made in the
aforementioned cases demonstrate that there has been hesitation
on the part of Canadian courts to intervene in cases where claims of
prenatal harm are made by children against their mothers, due to policy
considerations related to women’s reproductive autonomy.141 Rather than
identify fetal harm as separate from the maternal body, this approach
supports the understanding that the fetus exists within the woman’s body
and that, consequently, their relationship cannot be adversarial142 as the
interests of the fetus and the pregnant woman are inherently inseparable.
The judgements in DFG and Dobson recognized that imposing a duty
for women to protect a fetus through the regulation of her behaviours
would mean imposing a duty on her to treat her body, herself, in ways
determined by the Court.
The maternal exception in cases of prenatal harm recognized
in Canadian jurisprudence has particular implications for the case
of exposures to household chemicals. One of the risks of engaging
in litigation addressing toxic exposures is that the responsibility for
mitigating those exposures increasingly falls to women managing
their households, purchasing household supplies, and engaging in
precautionary consumption. The possibility of reproductive torts which
can address exposures may implicate manufacturers of these chemicals, or
their distributors, but they may also occur on an individualized basis, in
for inserting a pellet gun into her vagina and shooting her fetus. It was
apparent that charging women for homicide of the fetus or subsequently
born alive child raises the spectre of the slippery slope of prosecuting
women for substance abuse or a range of lawful behaviour. This would
invite the same type of scrutiny of the conduct of pregnant women and
interference with autonomy to which the Supreme Court of Canada in
DFG and Dobson referred in justifying the refusal to recognize the tort
duties in question.
141. BR v LR, 2004 ABQB 93 at para 35.
142. See Dobson, supra note 130 at para 72.
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which women responsible for exposing their families to toxic household
chemicals may be liable for the effects on their future children born
alive. If women, and especially pregnant women, are counselled to avoid
exposures by making smart decisions about what to eat, what to buy, and
what to do, there is a potential duty of care that may be imparted onto
women as they are increasingly expected to protect their families from
the harms associated with chemical exposures. Women who fail to avoid
cosmetics laden with phthalates, or who buy a used sofa leaching flame
retardants, may one day be seen as negligent by failing to avoid known
toxic substances and thereby exposing their child en ventre sa mère.
Dobson and DFG, and the maternal exception in prenatal tort
liability that they collectively establish, undermine the potential for such
claims. These cases offer important examples of the way that Canadian
government institutions, namely the judiciary and legislature, have
worked to advance women’s reproductive autonomy in pregnancy,
particularly since the 1990s.143 Claims made against pregnant women or
mothers for harms that occurred in utero are unlikely to garner success
following Dobson, and offer some protection for women who do not or
cannot engage in the laborious and expensive task of avoiding ubiquitous
household chemicals.

C.

The Birth of a Child as a Legal Harm (“Birth Torts”)

The tortious conduct in all of the above decisions was alleged to have
caused physical harm144 to the fetus. Even though the fetus is not a legal
person, once it is born alive tort law imagines how monetary compensation
143. While the Supreme Court of Canada has advanced women’s reproductive
autonomy in some cases, for some women, in many cases, “[w]hite
supremacy, colonialism, oppression on the basis of class, (dis)ability,
religion, language, sexual identity, and family status all combine with
restrictions tied to both biological and social reproduction to circumscribe
the lives of women and preclude their equality,” particularly in the
judgments of the Court. Sanda Rogers, “Women’s Reproductive Equality
and the Supreme Court of Canada” in Jocelyn Downie & Elaine Gibson,
eds, Health Law At the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2007) 189 at 191. See also Elizabeth Comack, ed, Locating Law: Race/
Class/Gender/Sexuality Connections, 2d ed (Halifax, NS: Irwin Law, 2006).
144. Or a risk of physical injury, in the case of DFG.
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can put the plaintiff back into his or her “original position” before he
or she was injured. The “birth torts,”145 a major class of reproductive
tort, are distinguishable from the preceding prenatal injury cases in
that rather than featuring negligence that physically changes the child,
it causes the mother of the child to lose the opportunity to avoid or
terminate an unwanted pregnancy. In other words, the birth of the child
is itself the legal damage. The counterfactual original position is having
avoided the unwanted pregnancy or birth. This notion of injury, and
courts’ departures from it, poses conceptual and legal difficulties and
has problematic social implications. Centrally, the notion of injury in
the birth torts involves evaluating the legal significance of the unwanted
birth of a “healthy” or “normal” child versus the unwanted birth of a
child with a disability.
Birth tort cases can be broken into various broad categories which,
though imperfect,146 permit a view of the different themes that emerge

145. See Melinda Jones, “Valuing All Lives – Even ‘Wrongful’ Ones” in Marcia
H Rioux, Lee Ann Basser & Melinda Jones, eds, Critical Perspectives on
Human Rights and Disability Law (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) 87 at
87 [Jones, “Valuing All Lives”].
146. Theorizing cases where the tortious act is the birth of a child has long
been the subject of debate, particularly regarding the idea that life
itself can be understood as a harm. The rejection of these categories
has largely been premised on the assumption that birth or life can be
conceptualized as a legal harm, and challenge the morality and capacity
of the judiciary to assess whether a life is worth living. The categories
of “wrongful pregnancy” (sometimes called “wrongful conception”)
“wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” are used here for purposes of clarity,
without intent to normalize or judge this categorization. See, for example,
David Archard, “Wrongful Life” (2004) 79:309 Philosophy 403; Kelly
E Rhinehart, “Debate over Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life” (2002)
26 Law & Psychol Rev 141; Jillian T Stein, “Backdoor Eugenics: The
Troubling Implications of Certain Damages Awards in Wrongful Birth
and Wrongful Life Claims” (2010) 40:3 Seton Hall L Rev 1117; Harvey
Teff, “The Action for ‘Wrongful Life’ in England and the United States”
(1985) 34:03 ICLQ 423; Stephen Todd, “Wrongful Conception,
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life” (2005) 27:3 Sydney L Rev 525. It is
also worth noting that “wrongful pregnancy” and “wrongful birth” as well
as “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” claims are not always distinguished
from one another. See discussion in Bevilacqua v Altenkirk, 2004 BCSC
945, at n 1 [Bevilacqua].
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within each. For heuristic purposes we divide birth torts into three
categories, namely “wrongful pregnancy,” “wrongful birth,” and “wrongful
life” claims. Wrongful pregnancy is claimed where a woman becomes
pregnant despite not wanting a pregnancy, often resulting from a failed
vasectomy;147 tubal ligation;148 incorrect advice stating that an individual
is infertile;149 a failed abortion attempt;150 or incorrect diagnosis that a
woman is not pregnant.151 In these cases, the tort is the negligent failure
of a health-care provider to prevent the conception or birth of a child
when no child at all is wanted.152
147. See e.g. McFarlane v Tayside Health Board, 1999 UKHL 50; Bevilacqua,
ibid; Thake v Maurice [1986] All ER 513 (QBD) [Thake].
148. See e.g. Kealey v Berezowski (1996), 30 OR (3d) 37 (SC) [Kealey];
Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust, [2001]
EWCA Civ 530; Rees v Darlington Memorial NHS Trust, [2003] UKHL
52; S(M) v Baker, 2001 ABQB 1032; Suite c Cooke, [1995] RJQ 2765
(CA) [Suite].
149. See e.g. Cattanach v Melchior, [2003] HCA 38 [Cattanach].
150. See e.g. Fredette v Wiebe (1986), 29 DLR (4th) 534 (BCSC); Roe v Dabbs,
2004 BCSC 957.
151. See e.g. RKP v Borkent, 2005 ABQB 42 (claim failed for lack of breach of
the standard of care).
152. There have been a number of different approaches in the common law
as to how to award damages where a healthy child is born. One such
approach is awarding no damages in holding that the birth of a healthy
child is not an injury recognized by the law, though this approach is rare
and currently only taken in Nevada. See e.g. Christensen v Thornby, 255
NW 620 (Minn Sup Ct 1934); Szekeres v Robinson, 715 P (2d) 1076 (Nev
Sup Ct 1986) [Szekeres]; Dotson v Bernstein, 207 P (3d) 911 at 915 (Colo
Ct App 2009), citing Szekeres. A second, more common approach is the
“limited damages” approach, wherein courts award compensation only for
the costs of the pregnancy, but not for child-rearing. See e.g. Cattanach,
supra note 149 at 174. A third approach – the offset-benefit approach –
recognizes the costs of raising a healthy child as a “compensable loss” but
reduces the award on the basis that having the child also brings benefits
to the plaintiffs. Kealey, supra note 148 at para 41; Cataford v Moreau,
[1978] CS 933 (Qc Sup Ct); Thake, supra note 147 (interestingly, in this
case child-rearing costs were awarded in a modest amount agreed by the
parties, but damages relating to labour and delivery was found to have
been completely offset by the benefits of having the child); Suite, supra
note 148; Troppi v Scarf, 187 NW (2d) 511(Mich Ct App 1971). Courts
have, in some cases, found that the benefits may or may not completely
cancel out the burdens. Under a fourth approach, the “total recovery”
approach, courts award compensation for all the reasonably foreseeable
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Wrongful birth claims involve claims brought by the parent(s) of a
child with a disability against a health-care provider for negligent failure
to provide the parent(s) the opportunity to avoid or terminate153 the
pregnancy. Unlike wrongful pregnancy claims, in the case of wrongful
birth a child is wanted, though not a child with a disability. The fact
scenarios which precipitate these claims vary, and include: negligent
failure to offer an amniocentesis to a woman at risk of having a child
with Down syndrome;154 failure to properly diagnose or warn the
mother about the risk to the fetus of contracting rubella during early
pregnancy;155 and negligent performance of or failure to warn about
the results of an ultrasound.156 The negligence may also occur prior to
conception, where it generally consists of inadequate genetic diagnosis
or counselling regarding the likelihood of the parents conceiving and
having a child with a genetic anomaly.157 The use of assisted reproductive

153.

154.

155.

156.

157.

damages resulting from the negligence, including the costs of raising
the child. Decisions in which this approach has been adopted include
Custodio v Bauer, 251 Cal App (2d) 303 (Cal Ct App 1967); Emeh v
Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority, [1984] 3
All ER 1044 (CA) (though this case dealt with the birth of a child with a
disability, the Court rejected the legal distinction in reaching its decision);
Joshi (Guardian ad litem of ) v Woolley (1995), 4 BCLR (3d) 208 (SC).
See Kealey, supra note 148 at para 38; Nadia N Sawicki, “Wrongful
Pregnancy, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth” (2005) 51:3 Medical Trial
Technique Quarterly 283 at 284.
See e.g. Jones (Guardian ad litem of ) v Rostvig, 2003 BCSC 1222 [Jones];
Krangle (Guardian ad lietem of ) v Brisco (1997), 154 DLR (4th) 707 (SC);
Zhang v Kan, 2003 BCSC 5; Raina v Shaw, 2006 BCSC 832 (claim failed
for failure to establish negligence).
See e.g. the American case of Gleitman v Cosgrove, 227 A (2d) 689 (NJ
Sup Ct 1967). An English example is that of McKay v Essex Area Health
Authority, [1982] QB 1166 (CA)[McKay]. The Canadian case of Arndt v
Smith, [1994] 8 WWR 568 (SC) [Arndt], aff’d [1997] 2 SCR 539, dealt
with the analogous fact situation pertaining to maternal chickenpox.
McColl v Hudson, [1998] BCJ No 801 (QL) (SC); McDonald-Wright
(Litigation Guardian of ) v O’Herlihy, 2007 ONCA 89, aff’g, 75 OR
(3d) 261 (SC); Mickle v Salvation Army Grace Hospital, Windsor Ontario
(1998), 166 DLR (4th) 743 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)) [Mickle]; Petkovic
(Litigation Guardian of ) v Olupona, [2002] OTC 221 (Ont Sup Ct J (Div
Ct))[Petkovic], leave to appeal to ONCA refused, 30 CCLT (3d) 266 (Sup
Ct J (Div Ct)).
Bartok v Shokeir, [1999] 2 WWR 386 (QB) [Bartok], aff’d (1998),
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technologies can also lead to wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, for
example through failure to screen for or avoid implantation of an embryo
that will produce a child with a disability.158
Wrongful life claims are similar to those of wrongful birth, except
that rather than parent(s) making the claim that they have been injured
by negligence leading to pregnancy or a “wrongful birth,” an individual
(usually a child) is arguing that his or her own birth is a harm.159 In such
cases the plaintiff argues that, but for the negligence of the defendant, his
or her mother would have avoided or terminated her pregnancy and thus
would have prevented his or her birth. These claims are often brought
based on practical considerations, namely that the time limitation period
for children to bring an action in tort is usually significantly longer than
that for adults, and the parents may have missed the window in which
they could bring their claim. Also, the anticipated award of damages to
the child may be greater than that to the parents, since the child-rearing
obligations of the parents generally cease when the child attains majority,
yet the child when grown may still incur expenses relating to his or her
condition.160 These cases have been met with almost universal refusal
among common law jurisdictions.161

158.

159.
160.
161.

168 Sask R 280 (CA); Holowaychuk v Hodges, 2003 ABQB 201
[Holowaychuk]; H(R) v Hunter (1996), 32 CCLT (2d) 44 (Ct J (Gen
Div)).
See e.g. Waller v James, [2006] HCA 16; Johnson et al v Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 124 Cal (2d) 650 (Ct App 2002); Paretta v Medical
Offices for Human Reproduction, 760 NYS (2d) 639 (Sup Ct 2003).
See Kealey, supra note 148 at para 39.
Paxton v Ramji, 2008 ONCA 697 at para 80 [Paxton], aff’g Paxton v
Ramji (2006), 146 ACWS (3d) 913 (SC) [Paxton 2006].
Only one Canadian appellate court has addressed the validity of the
claim, and refused to recognize it. See Lacroix (Litigation guardian of ) v
Dominique, 2001 MBCA 122 [Lacroix], leave to appeal to SCC refused,
2000 SCC A No 477. The superior courts in several provinces have
refused to recognize the action either at trial or on motion to dismiss. See
Arndt, supra note 155 at paras 16-28; Mickle, supra note 156 at para 11;
Jones, supra note 154. In other instances, courts have refused motions to
dismiss wrongful life claims, noting the unsettled nature of the area of
law, and also that dismissal would not save time at trial as the remaining
wrongful birth claim would cover many of the same issues. See Bartok,
supra note 157; Holowaychuk, supra note 157; Sharma (Litigation guardian
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Though wrongful pregnancy, wrongful birth, and wrongful life
respond primarily to instances of medical malpractice, they may also
address reproductive harms associated with exposures to household
chemicals. If prenatal testing and screening develops to the point where
the effects of household chemical exposures can be detected, it is not
farfetched to anticipate that some women may base a decision about
whether to maintain or terminate a pregnancy on this basis. In turn,
medicine and law could normalize this practice through birth tort claims
involving failure to detect and terminate a pregnancy where the child was
born with a condition resulting from prenatal chemical exposure. Whether
or not this contingency comes to pass, existing birth tort jurisprudence
offers important insights into some of the complexities of understanding
disability as a legal harm. Both in birth torts and cases of exposure to, for
example, BFRs and phthalates, a nuanced view of disability is necessary to
limit the stigmatization of people with disabilities while simultaneously
addressing the harms incurred through tortious action(s).
Commentators have taken different positions with respect to whether
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims should be permitted, primarily
in relation to the way that such claims theorize disability. Some affirm the
status quo of permitting wrongful birth but reject wrongful life claims,162
while others argue that wrongful life actions too, should be allowed.163
of ) v Mergelas, [1997] OJ No 5304 (QL) (Ct J (Gen Div)) (unreported);
Petkovic, supra note 156. Also, the common law of England, Australia,
and most US states do not recognize the action. See McKay, supra note
155.
162. See e.g. Penny Dimopoulos & Mirko Bagaric, “The Moral Status
of Wrongful Life Claims” (2003) 32:1 C L World Rev 35; Penny
Dimopoulos & Mirko Bagaric, “Why Wrongful Birth Actions are Right”
(2003) 11:2 Journal of Law and Medicine 230.
163. See e.g. John Anthony Eaton, “Wrongful Life Claims: A Comparative
Analysis” (2005) 35 Hong Kong LJ 671; Deana A Pollard, “Wrongful
Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence” (2003) 55:2 Ala L Rev 327;
Amos Shapira, ““Wrongful Life” Lawsuits for Faulty Genetic Counseling:
The Impaired Newborn as a Plaintiff” (1997) 13 Tel Aviv University
Studies in Law 97; Dean Stretton, “The Birth Torts: Damages for
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life” (2005) 10:1 Deakin Law Review 319;
Mark Strasser, “Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Death, and the
Right to Refuse Treatment: Can Reasonable Jurisdictions Recognize All
But One” (1999) 64:1 Mo L Rev 29; Wendy F Hensel, “The Disabling

116

Cattapan, Mykitiuk & Pioro, Notions of Reproductive Harm

Though these commentators differ in their particular rationales for
recognizing the tort and in their visions of how courts ought to approach
it, some ideas appear repeatedly. In reference to the concern that the law
would devalue life by considering an impaired existence an injury vis-àvis death or non-existence, they assert that the law regularly makes this
comparison in the area of refusal of medical treatment.164 They also cite
the right of abortion as reinforcing this conception of injury.165 As for the
difficulty of conceptualizing and calculating damages in such cases, these
commentators view the expenses associated with raising a child who has
a disability and damages for pain and suffering as straightforward heads
of damage that further the interests of deterring medical malpractice and
promoting distributive justice.166 In this way, commentators explicitly or
implicitly treat the birth of the child with a disability as equivalent to the
injury of a “healthy” child,167 or to the same effect, consider non-existence
to possess the same quality of symmetry, equilibrium, or neutrality of
being healthy and uninjured.168 Finally, they frame the award of damages
as promoting respect for individuals with disabilities by enabling the
acquisition of necessary care.169
Other commentators oppose the wrongful birth cause of action (and
explicitly or implicitly the wrongful life cause of action as well).170 Among
those opposed, some have focused on the impact of the tort on the rights
of people living with disabilities.171 Wendy Hensel argues that wrongful

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

171.

Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions” (2005) 40:1 Harv
CR-CLL Rev 141. See also Ronen Perry, “It’s a Wonderful Life” (2007)
93:2 Cornell L Rev 329 at 329, regarding alternative mechanisms for
recognizing the action of wrongful life as a breach of contract theory
(rather than as a tort).
Eaton, ibid at 679; Pollard, ibid at 359-61; Stretton, ibid at 357; Strasser,
ibid at 64, 75.
Eaton, ibid at 692; Pollard, ibid at 330.
Pollard, ibid at 338-42, 354; Shapira, supra note 163 at 100-01.
Shapira, ibid at 105-07.
Stretton, supra note 163 at 356, 358-59; Strasser, supra note 163 at 63.
Shapira, supra note 163 at 103-04; Stretton, ibid at 362.
See e.g. R Lee Akazaki, “‘Wrongful Birth’: An Ironic Name for a Cause
of Action in the Law of Medical Malpractice” (1999) 22:1 Advocates’ Q
102.
See e.g. Hensel, supra note 163; Darpana M Sheth, “Better Off Unborn?
An Analysis of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims under the
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birth and wrongful life claims send a “demeaning and demoralizing”
message to people with disabilities and society in general.172 Obtaining
compensation requires plaintiffs to “openly disavow their self-worth
and dignity,” as children or their mothers must testify that the pregnant
woman would have had an abortion.173 Legal inquiry in turn focuses on
the functional impairment of the child rather than the shared experience
of the stigmatization of disability, or on the socially constructed nature
of disability.174 As a result, “[a]ny benefits secured by individual litigants
in court are thus taxed to the community of people with disabilities as a
whole, placing at risk, in the drive for individual compensation, the gains
secured by collective action and identity.”175 Therefore, neither action
should be recognized.176
Sensitive to the messages these claims send, yet maintaining that
courts are unlikely to abandon them, Kerry Cooperman argues that
the recommended approach to upholding parental autonomy while
respecting individuals living with disabilities is to fashion remedies
and write judgments in a manner sensitive to the nature of disability.177
Americans with Disabilities Act” (2006) 73:4 Tenn L Rev 641.
Hensel, ibid at 164.
Ibid at 171-72.
Ibid at 144, 174-75.
Ibid at 144.
Ibid at 145. But see Jones, “Valuing All Lives”, supra note 145, arguing
that human rights principles support recovery in wrongful life claims.
Sheth builds on the arguments made by Hensel in describing how
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims violate the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12101 (1990). See Sheth, supra note 171.
Interestingly, at least one scholar has put forth a detailed argument
focusing on human rights principles, in particular that of human dignity,
in an attempt to support recovery in wrongful life claims. Jones considers
that an award of damages recognizing a wrong promotes dignity. She
conceives of the harm in wrongful life through comparing the position of
the disabled child with that of a healthy child, as the latter is the child the
mother believed she was carrying. She states that the main problem with
the tort is its name, which denotes a focus on the “victim” rather than on
the wrongful conduct of the defendant. Ideally a universal welfare scheme
would provide for the needs of all disabled individuals, rather than a tort
system offering compensation only to those who can make out a cause of
action.
177. Kerry T Cooperman, “The Handicapping Effect of Judicial Opinions in
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
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Cooperman supports the approach taken in Procanik v Cillo,178 the
New Jersey wrongful life decision accepting the claim for damages
associated with the costs of living with a disability but not for general
damages covering pain and suffering. Such an approach, he writes, avoids
viewing being born disabled as a harm, instead favouring a “contextual
jurisprudence that accounts for the social, financial, and moral concerns
of families, people with disabilities, and communities.”179 In particular,
it focuses on the “needs of the living” rather than on the preference of
non-life over life.180
These analyses of the birth torts offer a ready critique of notions of
reproductive harm where they involve negligence that leads to the birth
of a child living with a disability. The birth tort cases stand in contrast
to conventional prenatal injury claims where the negligence caused the
injury of a child who otherwise would have been born “healthy.” Such
situations raise difficult questions about the nature of harm or injury.
For example, an emphasis on the prevention of disability, which tort law
promotes through its deterrence function, risks portraying individuals
with disabilities in a stigmatizing manner.181 In contrast, tort law may have
difficulty recognizing that an injury has taken place in situations where
some of the parties concerned do not feel aggrieved or “wounded.”182
Decisions in the birth torts ought to avoid the dichotomy of viewing a
healthy child as a blessing versus a child with a disability as a harm, and
evaluate damages in terms of a nuanced view of disability taking into
account “biological, familial, financial, attitudinal, and social factors.”183
Reducing stigma against individuals living with disabilities depends on

178.
179.
180.
181.

182.

183.

Reproductive Tort Cases: Correcting the Legal Perception of Persons with
Disabilities” (2008) 68 Md L Rev Endnotes 1 at 14-15.
478 A (2d) 755 (NJ Sup Ct 1984) [Procanik].
Cooperman, supra note 177 at 19.
Ibid at 18, citing Procanik, supra note 178. See also Stein, supra note 146.
See Caroline Wang, “Culture, Meaning and Disability: Injury Prevention
Campaigns and the Production of Stigma” (1992) 35:9 Social Science &
Medicine 1093.
See Sarah S Lochlann Jain, Injury: The Politics of Product Design and Safety
Law in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006)
at 6.
Cooperman, supra note 177 at 18.
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careful characterization of injury, particularly in wrongful birth and
wrongful life claims.
Though not a matter of medical malpractice, and therefore currently
outside of the framework of “birth torts,” cases in which household
chemicals are linked to adverse health outcomes will similarly need to
strike a balance between openness to change in the human form and
acknowledging the blameworthiness of wrongdoers. However, the
consideration of being born with a disability as a harm or injury is
important to claims linked to exposure to toxic household chemicals.
To this end, successful birth torts affirm that causing fetal harm through
negligence in pregnancy is a legitimate site for legal action when the
negligence results in the birth of a child with a disability. If exposures
to household chemicals can be understood as a matter of negligence (i.e.
a failure to warn consumers of the potential effects of exposure during
pregnancy), it stands to reason that the principles of wrongful birth
claims may be extracted for application in factual scenarios addressing
prenatal exposures to household chemicals.

D.

Pre-Conception Torts

The third unique set of circumstances in reproductive tort involves claims
of negligence that occurred not simply prior to the birth of the child,
but prior to his or her conception. Pre-conception torts generally involve
negligence that occurs prior to conception and injury that occurs in utero.
The injury may also be alleged to have occurred prior to conception.
This situation can arise if gametes sustain damage prior to in vitro
fertilization,184 or if radiation or toxic substances influence the germ-line
cells of an individual who later has a child.185
184. See for example, Evi ML Petro et al, “Endocrine-disrupting Chemicals
in Human Follicular Fluid Impair In Vitro Oocyte Developmental
Competence” (2012) 27:4 Human Reproduction 1025; Victor Y
Fujimoto et al, “Serum Unconjugated Bisphenol A Concentrations
in Women May Adversely Influence Oocyte Quality During In Vitro
Fertilization” (2011) 95:5 Fertility and Sterility 1816.
185. See for example, Susan M Duty et al, “The Relationship Between
Environmental Exposures to Phthalates and DNA Damage in Human
Sperm Using the Neutral Comet Assay” (2003) 111:9 Environmental
Health Perspectives 1164; Russ Hauser, “Urinary Phthalate Metabolites
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Canadian courts have not explicitly addressed the viability of preconception tort claims. An overview of the American case law that has
dealt with the issue is helpful. On surveying the jurisprudence, one finds
that the prospect of recovery varies by fact scenario and by state. The
most successful cause of action has been that of a child injured as a result
of failure of the mother’s physician to treat her against Rh sensitization
following the birth of a prior child with incompatible Rh factor blood.186
A standard and straightforward treatment, its omission can lead to serious
illness or stillbirth of a subsequently conceived child with incompatible
Rh factor blood.187 Courts in various states have allowed this type of
claim, even where the injured child was not conceived until several years
after the negligence occurred.188 The state of New York, however, which
has consistently denied preconception tort claims, refused to recognize
this cause of action in a relatively recent decision.189
In contrast to the overall success of the above cause of action, no
court has allowed a claim involving injury resulting from an automobile
accident to a child that was not yet conceived at the time of the accident.190
This example provides an illustration of how conception can serve as
a dividing line with respect to duty. Recognizing the claim of a child
in utero has been unproblematic in the automobile collision context.
However, courts dealing with pre-conception claims have held that it
is not foreseeable that a child would be injured as a result of a collision

186.
187.

188.

189.
190.

and Semen Quality: A Review of a Potential Biomarker of Susceptibility”
(2008) 31:2 International Journal of Andrology 112.
Julie A Greenberg, “Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts” (1997) 64:2
Tenn L Rev 315 at 336-37.
Karen Fung Kee Fung et al, “Prevention of Rh Alloimmunization” (2003)
25:9 Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada 765; Lough v Rolla
Women’s Clinic, Inc, 866 SW (2d) 851 at 852 (Mo Sup Ct 1993).
Greenberg, supra note 186 at 323-26; Matthew Browne, “Preconception
Tort Law in an Era of Assisted Reproduction: Applying a Nexus Test for
Duty” (2001) 69:6 Fordham L Rev 2555 at 2567-72. As a variation on
the facts of the majority of cases cited involving Rh sensitization, the
successful 1967 preconception tort case of Renslow v Mennonite Hospital,
367 NE (2d) 1250 (Ill Sup Ct 1977) [Renslow], involved the negligent
transfusion of Rh positive blood to an Rh negative woman who became
sensitized and later conceived and gave birth to a child harmed as a result.
Barakov v Beth Israel Med Ctr, 44 AD (3d) 981 (NY App Div 2007).
Browne, supra note 188 at 2578.
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involving a woman who was not yet pregnant at the time.191
Less consistent in terms of outcome are cases centring on surgery
and other medical treatment, products including pharmaceuticals, and
exposure to toxic substances (usually in an employment context).192
Successful surgery actions have taken place in Michigan193 and Missouri.194
Both actions involved a subsequently conceived child injured by negligent
performance of a caesarean section during the birth of a prior child.
The case of Albala v City of New York195 similarly involved the negligent
performance of an abortion that led to the injury of a child subsequently
conceived. In that case, the New York Court of Appeals held that to allow
the proposed cause of action would “require the extension of traditional
tort concepts beyond manageable bounds.”196 The Court also noted
that the proposed duty would encourage doctors to practice defensive
medicine, and that “society as a whole would bear the cost of our placing
physicians in a direct conflict between their moral duty to patients and
the proposed legal duty to those hypothetical future generations outside
the immediate zone of danger.”197
With respect to products liability, recovery has been sparse. Though
one court refused to dismiss a claim alleging injury to children conceived
and born subsequent to their mother’s taking birth control pills,198 most
pre-conception actions involving pharmaceuticals have been unsuccessful
claims by grandchildren of women who took DES during pregnancy.199
As noted above, women exposed to DES in utero had an array of
191. McAuley v Wills, 303 SE (2d) 258 (Ga Sup Ct 1983).
192. Browne, supra note 188 at 2555 ff.
193. Martin v St John Hospital and Medical Center, 517 NW (2d) 787 (Mich
Ct App 1994).
194. Bergstreser v Mitchell, 577 F (2d) 22 (8th Cir 1978).
195. 54 NY (2d) 269 (Ct App 1981).
196. Ibid at 271-72.
197. Ibid at 274.
198. Jorgensen v Meade, 483 F (2d) 237 (10th Cir 1973).
199. The lack of success in DES claims has been attributed in part to the long
latency period between exposure and the discovery of reproductive harm
in DES granddaughters. See Glen O Robinson, “Multiple Causation in
Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases” (1982) 68:4 Va L Rev 713. See
also discussion of difficulty identifying a plaintiff in multigenerational
DES cases below at note 272 and accompanying text.
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adverse health outcomes including uterine anomalies that impeded their
capacity to carry a pregnancy to term. As a result, some of their children
suffered injury due to premature birth. In one such claim – Enright v
Eli Lilly (which involved claims made by a “DES granddaughter” born
with cerebral palsy) – the New York Court of Appeals held that the
principles expressed in Albala applied, as recognizing liability could lead
to over-deterrence and a disincentive for drug manufacturers to produce
generally useful products.200 The Court also worried that recognizing a
duty here would lead to claims for damages by subsequent generations
of plaintiffs.201
Several decisions suggest that some jurisdictions may recognize a
duty to plaintiffs not yet conceived in workplace and other exposure
scenarios, though having to satisfy every element of the relevant cause
of action, including causation, has limited recovery.202 The United States
Supreme Court in International Union, UAW v Johnson Controls203
referred in passing to the possibility of pre-conception tort liability.
In the decision, the Court held that an employer measure prohibiting
women of childbearing capacity from participating in work activities
where they would be exposed to lead, a teratogen, impermissibly
discriminated against women and was not accepted as a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ). The majority found the prospect
of tort liability to injured infants to be remote.204 They based this
conclusion on the facts that the employer was informing women of the
risks associated with lead exposure and complying with Occupational
Safety and Health Administration standards concerning such exposure,
and that federal anti-discrimination law would pre-empt state tort law if
it were impossible to comply with both.205 The concurring judgment of
200. 77 NY (2d) 377 at 386-87 (Ct App 1991).
201. Ibid at 387.
202. See e.g. Coley v Commonwealth Edison Co, 768 F Supp 625 (Ill Dist
Ct 1991); Second Nat’l Bank v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 390 NE (2d) 229
(Ind Ct App 1979). See also Daniel S Goldberg, “Against Genetic
Exceptionalism: An Argument in Favor of the Viability of Preconception
Genetic Torts” (2007) 10:2 J Health Care L & Pol’y 259.
203. 499 US 187 (US 1991) [Johnson Controls].
204. Ibid at 208.
205. Ibid at 208-09.
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Justice Scalia similarly states that, as the employer has not demonstrated
“a substantial risk of tort liability,” the argument that its fetal protection
policy is a BFOQ is necessarily defeated.206 In contrast, Justice White,
though concurring in the result, emphasized that given the increasing
recognition of pre-conception tort,207 a fetal protection policy could be
justified if an employer could establish that it was “reasonably necessary
to avoid substantial tort liability.”208
Perhaps most relevant to the case of exposure to household chemicals
is a more recent American pre-conception tort case in which the District
Court for the Northern District of California decided a case involving
alleged genetic damage and injury due to toxic environmental emissions.
The Court held with respect to the pre-conception claims that the
defendant emitter did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs as it did not provide
“goods or services related to the reproductive process.”209 Following the
precedent set in a California pre-conception automobile injury case,210 the
Court held that the alleged injuries were not reasonably foreseeable. The
Court suggested that the law may change when “science and medicine
progress to the point that scientists can interpret individual DNA
histories or can confidently attribute injuries to chemical exposure.”211
Despite the suggestion of the District Court for the Northern District
of California regarding the potential for future claims in which injuries can
be clearly attributed to chemical exposures, and the increased recognition
of preconception torts outlined in Johnson Controls, the challenge posed
by the lack of concrete evidence of intergenerational reproductive harm
in the case of household chemicals is, as yet, a particularly difficult legal
obstacle to overcome. Yet, it is pre-conception injury scenarios that may
be most useful to theorizing intergenerational reproductive harm that
may be caused by exposure to household chemicals. Pre-conception
injury scenarios by their nature raise concern over liability for harm
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Ibid at 223-24.
Ibid at 213.
Ibid at 212-13.
Avila v Remco Hydraulics, 633 F (3d) 828 at 848 (9th Circ 2011).
Hegyes v Unjian, 234 Cal App (3d) 1103 at 1138 (Ct App 1991)[Hegyes].
Whitlock v Pepsi Americas, 681 F Supp (2d) 1123 at 1127 (Cal Dist Ct
2010).
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to future generations. As such, they clearly implicate indeterminacy
of liability in time and class, and by a function of these, together with
the fact that damages for injuries to infants often amount to millions
of dollars, indeterminacy in amount as well. American pre-conception
tort judgments have noted the “staggering” implications of recognizing a
duty: courts have referred to the prospect of liability to younger siblings
of the plaintiff child conceived and born to a woman previously injured
in an automobile collision,212 or, in the case of a young woman who
becomes sensitized to the Rh factor through blood transfused at a young
age and whose child brings a claim upon reaching majority, liability to
children in a proceeding taking place “half a century after the negligent
act was performed.”213 Given the ubiquity of household chemicals,
lack of knowledge about their health effects (particularly in terms of
multigenerational effects and exposures in utero), and the diffuse, oftengradual nature of exposure, factual scenarios that will pertain to harm
caused by BFRs and phthalates may often involve indeterminate liability.
Courts and scholars attempting to allay concerns regarding the
potential burden of indeterminate liability make several points. First,
they assert that the actual number of pre-conception tort claims is and
will be very small.214 This may not be persuasive in Canadian courts as
indeterminate liability has been noted to be a concern over just that:
indeterminacy, and not simply the volume of claims.215 Next, concern
over indeterminate liability has been addressed by distinguishing certain
injuries from “self-perpetuating” conditions such as exposure to chemicals
or radiation resulting in germ-line genetic changes.216 Any indeterminacy
would be far less pronounced if liability only extends to individuals in
a single generation. This approach, however, distinguishes rather than
212. Hegyes, supra note 210 at 1119.
213. Renslow, supra note 188 at 376 (quoted from the dissenting judgment).
214. Hegyes, supra note 210 at 1151-52 (dissenting judgment); Goldberg supra
note 202 (referring to “the problem of multi-generational liability” as “the
proverbial storm in a teacup” at 282), and citing Greenberg, supra note
186.
215. See e.g. Canadian National Railway Co v Norsk Pacific Steamship Co,
[1992] 1 SCR 1021 at 1126-27 [Norsk].
216. See e.g. Hegyes, supra note 210 at 1146 (dissenting judgment); Renslow,
supra note 188 at 358.
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resolves the issue of transgenerational harm. To this latter end, some
advocate employing a case-by-case analysis of what essentially amounts
to foreseeability and proximity, rather than categorically denying any preconception duty.217 Others propose drawing the line at allowing recovery
only for first generation pre-conception claimants.218 In Canadian law,
sufficient proximity may address concerns over indeterminate liability.219
As precedent in pre-conception tort is limited, it is not possible
to confidently predict how Canadian courts will resolve the issues
of foreseeability, proximity, and the residual policy consideration of
indeterminate liability, and further, how they might do so in a factual
scenario involving exposures to household chemicals. Given the holdings
in Bovingdon v Hergott220 and Paxton,221 it is probable that courts in
Ontario, if not Canada as a whole, will take a conservative approach,
not recognizing all of the pre-conception causes of action that have been
successful in the US. This will make recovery difficult where household
chemicals result in injuries, reproductive or otherwise, for a child yet-tobe-conceived.

IV.

Rethinking the Categorization of “Reproductive
Torts”

There are a number of Canadian cases which do not fit neatly into the
aforementioned scheme, and which have ultimately motivated courts to
rethink their approach to reproductive tort. These cases simultaneously
consider some combination of prenatal injury, birth torts, and
217. See Tracey I Batt, “DES Third-Generation Liability: A Proximate Cause”
(1996) 18:3 Cardozo L Rev 1217 at 1232. Granted, this is a somewhat
circular argument in that it does not explain what factors would lead
to a finding of foreseeability and proximity or address concerns over
indeterminate liability; however, it does argue against a blanket no-duty
rule for preconception claims.
218. See the dissenting judgment in Grover v Eli Lilly & Co, 63 Ohio St (3d)
756 at para 766 (Ohio Sup Ct 1992).
219. See Norsk, supra note 215 at para 258, but see contra the minority
concurring judgment at para 321.
220. (2006), 83 OR (3d) 465 (Sup Ct), aff’d 2008 ONCA 2 [Bovingdon 2008].
221. Paxton, supra note 160. See also Liebig v Guelph General Hospital, 2009
CanLII 56297 (Ont Sup Ct).
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preconception injury with varying outcomes. Taken together, these cases
suggest a shift away from categorical classification of reproductive tort,
and towards determining the legitimacy of prenatal and preconception
claims drawing on the two-stage Anns test.222 As discussed below, this
approach at once promotes the recognition of women’s autonomy by
providing a means to balance the duty of care against relevant policy
considerations, while establishing a need for a clear and direct relationship
between the tortfeasor and plaintiff through foreseeability and proximity
in duty of care.
The 1992 decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Cherry
(Guardian ad litem of ) v Borsman223 concerned facts that resembled both
prenatal injury and wrongful life situations. The adult plaintiff, while
pregnant, was the patient of the defendant who performed an abortion
procedure on her, which failed. The infant plaintiff alleged that negligent
performance of the procedure itself caused her to be born with a severe
disability. At trial the defendant was found liable to both plaintiffs.
One of the key issues on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in
holding that the defendant owed a duty to the fetus not to harm it while
performing an abortion procedure at the request of the adult plaintiff.
The Court held that this was not a wrongful life case, as the defendant
argued. Agreeing with the trial judge and with the infant plaintiff, the
court noted that wrongful life cases are characterized by an assertion of
“a legal obligation to the foetus to terminate its life,”224 while the case in
question involved an infant plaintiff physically injured by the defendant’s
negligence. This supported a cause of action as the defendant owed a
duty to the mother to properly perform the procedure, as well as to the
subsequently born child not to harm it if he failed in carrying out his
duty to the mother. Thus, though in actual fact the child would not have
been born but for the negligence, the court afforded the child a remedy
by defining the claim through the duty not to injure.
In another case, Lacroix v Dominique,225 the Manitoba Court of
222. Anns v Merton London Borough Council, [1977] All ER 118 [Anns].
223. 94 DLR (4th) 487 (BCCA) [Cherry], aff’g (1990), 75 DLR (4th) 668
(BCSC).
224. Ibid at para 71.
225. Supra note 161.
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Appeal was also faced with a factual scenario in which it was unclear
whether the injury was harm to the child en ventre sa mère, or a wrongful
life claim. The plaintiff parents consulted the defendant neurologist about
whether the medication the mother was taking to control her epilepsy
would pose risks to any children they would have while she was taking
the medication. The parents alleged, and the trial judge found, that the
defendant had not properly advised the plaintiff parents of the risks.
Their second child, the infant plaintiff Donna, “was born with physical
anomalies and was diagnosed as being developmentally delayed and
retarded.”226 The trial judge had found that the cause of her disabilities
was the medication, and that had the parents been properly advised the
mother would not have become pregnant.227
In setting out its analysis concerning the child’s claim, the Court
of Appeal stated, “[c]ases involving a claim by a child born with
abnormalities generally fall within one of two categories: (1) cases
in which the abnormalities have been caused by the wrongful act or
omission of another; and (2) cases in which, but for the wrongful act or
omission, the child would not have been born at all.”228 The Court cited
Cherry as an example of a case falling under the first category, noting the
ultimate award of damages to the child.229 As for the second category, the
court in Lacroix concluded that, based on the fact that the mother would
not have become pregnant had she been properly advised, the case fell
into the second category, and that the trial judge was therefore correct in
rejecting the child’s claim.230
The 2008 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bovingdon
responded to both Cherry and Lacroix. The case featured a woman
who was prescribed Clomid to aid with ovulation, and who later gave
birth to twins with disabilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
obstetrician negligently failed to inform the mother of the risks associated
with taking the drug, specifically the possibility of prematurely giving
birth to twins, and of the risks associated with premature birth, including
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Ibid at para 5.
Ibid at para 8.
Ibid at para 24.
Ibid at para 25.
Ibid at para 42.
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cerebral palsy.231 At trial, the defendant was found to have owed a duty
of care to the infant twin plaintiffs. Pardu J held, relying on Lacroix, that
this was not a wrongful life case because the defendant, in prescribing
Clomid, caused not only the birth of the children, but also their injury.232
The defendant appealed.
Justice Feldman, in her judgment on behalf of the Court of Appeal,
reviewed the two-category analysis set out in Lacroix, and rejected it as
failing to provide “a coherent theory that can assist courts in making
the difficult decision of when a child should be able to recover damages
from a doctor for being born with disabilities.”233 The trouble with the
approach was that cases such as Cherry and Lacroix could be viewed as
falling into either category, with the negligence capable of being viewed
as causing both the injury as well as the birth of the child. She preferred
to approach the claim “through the normal analysis of tort liability: duty
of care, standard of care, breach, and damage.”234 With respect to the first
issue, the infant plaintiffs argued that the defendant owed them a duty
co-extensive to that owed to their mother, namely, to properly inform
her of the risks associated with taking the fertility drug Clomid.235 The
plaintiffs further asserted, likely in order to avoid the characterization
of their claim as one for wrongful life, that they had the right “to have a
drug-free conception, with a reduced risk of disability, rather than a right
not to be born.”236
Feldman JA held that because the defendant’s duty was to provide
information to help the mother make the decision of whether or not to
take the drug, it could not be said that the children had a right to a drugfree birth. Neither could they be owed a duty co-extensive with that owed
to the mother, since it is the mother’s choice whether to take the drug or
not. She could, after all, have chosen to take the drug notwithstanding
any risks to the children.237 The defendant therefore did not owe a duty
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Bovingdon 2008, supra note 220 at para 13.
Ibid at para 4.
Ibid at para 55.
Ibid at para 61.
Ibid at para 62.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 68.
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to the children not to cause them harm in prescribing Clomid to their
mother.238 Policy considerations also supported this conclusion, in
that recognizing the duty would create a potential conflict: physicians
might refuse to offer to prescribe Clomid to women for fear that doing
so could breach a duty owed to their future children.239 Feldman JA
indicated that in deciding the case at bar on the basis of duty, she was
not commenting on the viability of the wrongful life cause of action.240
She also distinguished the case at bar from the case where a child alleges
that a physician negligently prescribed his or her mother a drug that is
contraindicated for pregnant women.241
Later the same year, the Court took on this very issue in the
case of Paxton v Ramji. In this case, Dawn Paxton had requested her
physician, the defendant Dr. Ramji, to prescribe Accutane to treat her
acne condition.242 As Accutane is a teratogen, as per the standard of
care, specific precautions are supposed to be taken to ensure that the
patient does not become pregnant while taking Accutane, namely the
use of two forms of birth control (when the patient is not abstinent).243
In prescribing the drug,244 Dr. Ramji relied on the fact that Ms. Paxton’s
husband had undergone a vasectomy about 4 1/2 years prior to her
commencing the treatment.245 Shortly after commencing treatment,
however, Ms. Paxton became pregnant due to failure of the vasectomy.246
As a result, Jaime Paxton was born “with a number of severe disabilities
Ibid at para 70.
Ibid at para 71.
Ibid at para 72.
Ibid at para 69.
Paxton, supra note 160 at para 5.
Ibid at paras 6-7.
As Accutane is a teratogen, it was only supposed to be prescribed
following the Pregnancy Protection Mainpro-C Program (PPP) developed
by the drug’s manufacturer, which stipulates that the patient use effective
contraception from one month prior to commencing treatment, until
one month after ceasing treatment. Specifically, two reliable birth control
methods were to be used simultaneously, unless abstinence was the chosen
method (not merely a vasectomy as in Paxton). See ibid at paras 6-7;
Paxton 2006, supra note 160 at para 136.
245. Paxton, ibid at para 2.
246. Ibid at para 9.
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as a result of her exposure to Accutane while in utero, including a right
facial palsy; seizures; generalized hypotonia; megalencephaly of the left
occipital lobe of the brain; prominent dysmorphic features; hearing loss;
anotia (absent right ear); and microtia (malformed left ear).”247
The infant plaintiff brought a claim in negligence against Dr.
Ramji.248 At trial, Justice Eberhard held that a physician owes a duty
to the “unconceived child of a woman of childbearing potential”249
not to prescribe Accutane if it was contraindicated, specifically if the
patient is of childbearing potential and the physician is not satisfied
that she will avoid pregnancy while taking the drug.250 In arriving at this
conclusion, Eberhard J first turned to the classification of causes of action
in reproductive tort, considering the analysis in Lacroix as particularly
persuasive.251 Viewing the duty as one not to prescribe the drug to a
woman if she were unable or unwilling to follow the required birth
control methods, she concluded that the duty was owed to the potential
child of the patient (not to injure her/him).252 She acknowledged that
“in the abstract” this duty gave rise to a concern about conflict with the
physician’s duty to his or her patient.253 However, “in the real world,”
physicians already deal with this conflict, as the standard of care imposed
by the medical community “demands that protections must be put in
place to avoid pregnancy before Accutane can be given.”254
Eberhard J distinguished the facts of the case at bar from those in
Lacroix. As the medication in Lacroix was required for the mother’s health
as well as for that of her future child, it was impossible to hold that the
physician owed a duty to the future child in prescribing the drug.255 She
also justified holding that a duty of care could be owed in this case to a
child before he or she was conceived. She noted that whether a woman
is already pregnant or later becomes pregnant when prescribed Accutane,
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Ibid at para 11.
Ibid at paras 2, 17.
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the risk and injury to the child may be the same and the pregnancy is
equally “foreseeable and proximate.”256 Notwithstanding, having held
that the defendant owed a duty to the infant plaintiff not to prescribe
Accutane to her mother if it was contraindicated, the trial judge found
that Dr. Ramji had met the standard of care in relying on the vasectomy
as an effective means of addressing Ms. Paxton’s child bearing potential.
Thus, the prescription of Accutane was not contraindicated and the claim
was dismissed.257
The plaintiffs appealed the trial judge’s findings with respect to
standard of care,258 while the defendants used the appeal to argue against
the recognition of a duty of care to Jaime. The Court of Appeal disposed
of the appeal by overturning the trial judge’s holding with respect to duty.
Feldman JA, who wrote the decision, echoed her judgment in Bovingdon
in criticizing the Lacroix approach of evaluating claims by determining
whether or not they could be characterized as wrongful life.259 Instead,
she referred to a line of tort cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Canada, relating to various factual subject matters, which set out and
apply the basic test for determining whether a duty of care should be
recognized.260 To this end, the Court held that there was “no settled
jurisprudence in Canada on the question whether a doctor can be in a
proximate relationship with a future child who was not yet conceived or
born at the time of the doctor’s impugned conduct,”261 nor was there an
analogous duty of care.262 Feldman JA thus turned to the Anns test263 to
first establish whether the foreseeability and proximity of duty of care
necessary to establish a prima facie duty of care exists, and then, if such
a duty existed, to examine whether residual policy considerations should

256. Ibid at para 206.
257. Ibid at paras 211-16.
258. They also appealed a finding that Jaime would not be entitled to punitive
damages.
259. Paxton, supra note 160 at paras 28-29.
260. Ibid at para 29.
261. Ibid at para 53.
262. Ibid at para 54.
263. See ibid at paras 60-80, citing Anns, supra note 222 and subsequent
Canadian jurisprudence.
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limit recognition of the duty.264
Feldman JA found that, though the injury was foreseeable, the
physician’s relationship with the child-yet-to-be-conceived was not
proximate enough to recognize a duty. Imposing a duty of care for children
not yet conceived could result in physicians offering “treatment to some
female patients in a way that might deprive them of their autonomy and
freedom of informed choice in their medical care.”265 Citing the Supreme
Court of Canada decisions in Dobson and DFG, Feldman JA stated that
“[b]ecause women are autonomous decision makers with respect to their
own bodies, they neither make the decision on behalf of the future child,
nor do they owe a duty to act in the best interests of a future child.”266
In the case of prescribing a teratogenic drug, the physician can only
enlist the agreement of the woman not to become pregnant, but he or
she cannot ensure that she will abide by that agreement.267 Feldman JA
went on to state that residual policy considerations would likewise make
imposition of a duty seem unwise.268 It could, for example, destabilize
women’s right to abortion,269 presumably by promoting the view that the
future child has its own legal interests apart from those of the mother. As
a result of the holding with respect to duty, the appeal was dismissed.270
The Canadian case law covering reproductive tort cases involving
multiple claims (i.e. a combination of prenatal injury, wrongful birth,
wrongful life, and preconception claims), culminating in the decision
in Paxton, signifies a shift away from resolving disputes by determining
whether they give rise to wrongful life claims, to approaching them using
the ordinary principles of tort law. As noted above, this approach to
reproductive tort law is particularly useful to address conflicting duties
of care. In such cases, determining a duty of care relies on first proximity
and foreseeability (following the Anns test), balanced against specific
264. Ibid at para 35, quoting Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v BD, 2007 SCC
38 at para 3.
265. Ibid at para 68.
266. Ibid at para 73.
267. Ibid at paras 74-75.
268. Ibid at para 77.
269. Ibid at para 79.
270. Ibid at para 88.
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policy considerations.
The idea that a duty of care to a woman may preclude a duty of care
to a fetus or preconceived embryo, following the policy considerations of
the Anns test recognized in Paxton, is integral to upholding the principles
of judicial non-intervention in the governance of pregnancy established
in DFG and Dobson. The inseparability of a woman, a fetus, and her
preconceived embryos is important here, and Paxton asserted that the
unique nature of this relationship cannot require a duty of care.271
Applied to the case of exposures to toxic household chemicals, this
may mean that through the application of the Anns test, and the policy
considerations emergent in DFG and Dobson, women, and in certain
cases the physicians treating them, may not be liable for the exposure
of either fetuses or preconceived embryos to exposures to household
chemicals that may result in injury.
Apart from the issues of proximity and foreseeability raised in
the application of the Anns test to prenatal and preconception claims,
recovery will be unlikely in cases where the harms incurred cannot be
clearly and directly linked to a particular origin, or where cause-andeffect in injury are unclear. For example, determining a duty of care for
particular pharmaceutical companies has been difficult as plaintiffs whose
mothers took DES are often unable to determine the manufacturer of
the drugs taken by their mothers decades ago.272 Factual scenarios where
individuals may be exposed to a wide array of household chemicals prior
to conception, in utero, and/or in breastfeeding make it difficult to discern
when and how exposures took place, which chemicals are responsible
for what physiological harms, and which manufacturers should be held
liable.

V.

Conclusion

Reproductive tort jurisprudence has a number of significant implications
for the litigation of injuries caused by prenatal and preconception
exposure to household chemicals. The decisions in prenatal injury cases
271. Ibid at para 68.
272. “Jury Awards $42.3 Million to Women in Drug Lawsuit”, The New York
Times (9 January 1994) 28.
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(including Montreal Tramways and Duval) that do not include claims
against a pregnant woman suggest that the cause of action for personal
injury sustained while in utero is well-established. Though reproductive
harms caused by household chemicals are, as noted above, most often the
result of diffuse, cumulative exposures, these cases identify the potential
for such claims to succeed. Further, they remind us that causation need
not be definitively proven, as long as the relationship between the harm
done and the purported causation can be reasonably established on a
balance of probabilities.
Canadian courts have, following DFG and Dobson, established a
legal framework that demonstrates flexibility in conceptualizing prenatal
claims made against pregnant women.273 Recognizing the pre-eminence
of the right to reproductive autonomy, the Supreme Court of Canada has
refused to permit claims of prenatal harm brought by a child, once born,
against his or her mother. In Paxton and Lacroix, the courts also refused
to permit claims in cases of preconception injury insofar as claims against
individuals who owe the pregnant woman a duty would conflict with
any duty owed to her future child. Given the undue burdens on women
to avoid exposing themselves and their families to toxic household
chemicals, these principles are particularly relevant.
While the recognition of women’s reproductive autonomy
attributable to the application of the Anns test in Paxton is important,
the dominance of proximity and foreseeability in the Anns test renders
this model problematic in cases where the factual scenario involves
intergenerational harms caused by ongoing, diffuse exposures to
household chemicals. Foreseeability might be addressed simply by
the knowledge that household chemicals may adversely affect the
reproductive system. However, if there is widespread public knowledge
that exposures are harmful, the onus might equally fall to consumers
to avoid products containing these chemicals. The costs of educating
oneself about household chemicals, of finding the right stores and the
right products with phthalate-free shampoo and flame-retardant free
pajamas will, following Lee and Scott,274 fall to women, plagued by
273. Mykitiuk & Scott, supra note 116 at 341.
274. See generally Lee & Scott, supra note 20.

(2015) 1 CJCCL

135

the challenges of engaging in precautionary consumption. For those
financially or otherwise unable to avoid exposures, seeking damages in
tort might not be an option due to difficulty in pointing to a duty of care
or in establishing causation, depending on the nature of the particular
situation. Further, proximity in such cases could be easily undermined by
an understanding that only those exposed are eligible to seek damages,
mitigating problems of indeterminate liability.
In addition, the recognition of birth or life with a disability as a
legal harm has important implications for the disability community,
insofar as “disability comes to be seen as an injury, something located
in the individual, and something for which someone ought to be held
at fault.”275 Alternative approaches such as judgements that do not
identify being born with a disability as a harm, but rather provide for
the financial costs of living with a disability in contemporary society
(following Cooperman),276 may work to identify the problematic nature
of theorizing birth and life as harms, while providing for peoples’ needs.
Reproductive torts jurisprudence needs to consider the diversity of
human experience while recognizing the needs plaintiffs may experience
in living with or raising a child with a disability.
Overall, reproductive tort law offers insightful principles for
approaching cases involving the adverse health outcomes linked to
exposures to brominated flame retardants and/or phthalates. However,
the potential for obtaining a remedy is limited. Given the state of the
science, demonstrating a clear relationship between exposures and
physiological harms incurred is unlikely, and defendants are not easily
identified. Moreover, success for claims of intergenerational reproductive
harm caused by exposures to household chemicals is unlikely under
Canadian tort law.
What remains is that Canadians and others continue to be exposed
to household chemicals suspected of causing harms to the reproductive
systems of those exposed, and to future generations. Existing animal and
275. Jennifer Ann Rinaldi, “Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: The
Devaluation of Life with Disability” (2009) 1:1 Journal of Public Policy,
Administration and Law 1 at 6.
276. Cooperman, supra note 177 at 14-15.
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human studies, as noted above, demonstrate important implications of
these exposures, to the extent that particular phthalates have already
been banned from the Canadian marketplace. If tort law is insufficient
to address these intergenerational reproductive harms, then further study
is required to establish how chemical and product manufacturers can
be deterred from causing the injuries associated with production of
these chemicals, how states can better regulate their use, and what legal
recourse can be sought if and when all else fails.

